Papal documents relating to Franciscan poverty
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POPE JOHN XXII, QUIA QUORUNDAM
Translated by John Kilcullen and John Scott
Copyright
(c) 1996, 1998, R.J. Kilcullen, J.R. Scott.
[1] Since it is said that the Father of the Lie has so
blinded the minds of some that they have tried, not without much
punishable rashness, to destroy {detrahere} our constitutions Ad
conditorem canonum and Quum inter nonnullos--composed
{digestis} certainly {utique} with diligent preparatory deliberation
with our Brothers the cardinals of the holy Roman Church, and with
many archbishops and bishops and other prelates of the Church, and
also with many masters of sacred theology and professors of both
laws, and promulgated with the advice of our Brothers before
mentioned-- and try to obscure the truth they contain with mad
falsehoods: against such pernicious acts of daring, lest their
pestiferous doctrine have power to cause the souls of the simple to
stumble and lead them into the by-way of their own error, we have
decided, with the advice of the same Brothers, to provide salutarily
upon this matter as follows.
[2] To attack the before mentioned constitutions, it
is reported, they have used publicly in word and in writing the
following argument. They say that
-
whatever, through the key of knowledge [see gloss,
col. 154, z], the Roman pontiffs have once defined in faith and
morals persists so immutably that it is not licit for a successor to
call it again into doubt nor affirm the contrary (though, they say,
it is otherwise with things ordained through the key of power).
- But in the confirmation of the rule
of the Order of Friars Minor by our predecessors, the supreme
pontiffs Honorius III, Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Alexander IV, and
Nicholas IV [rather, III--the confusion continues below], they assert
that these words are contained: "This is Christ's gospel rule,
and, imitating it, the Apostles' rule, that they have in {quae...
habet... habent} nothing in this world proper or common [i.e. no
property as individuals or as a group], but they have in the things
they use simple use of fact"; presuming to add to these [words]
that the before mentioned supreme pontiffs and many general councils
have defined through the key of knowledge that the
poverty of Christ and the Apostles consisted perfectly in lack of
ownership of any temporal civil and worldly lordship, and that their
sustenance consisted also solely in bare use of fact; from which they
try to conclude
- that it was not lawful, and is not
lawful, for their successors to make any change against the foregoing
[i.e. the points defined].
And therefore,
-
since our constitution, going (in the above argument)
against the definitions of our predecessors before mentioned (so they
say), defined that Christ and the Apostles had, in
the things they had, not only simple use of fact, but the right
of dealing {faciendi} with them [i.e. of using, giving away,
exchanging, etc.], and that sacred scripture testifies that they did
do those things, declaring heretical the
pertinacious assertion of those who say that they did not have such a
right (since they imply {concludere} that their acts were not just,
which is wicked to say of Christ),
- they try to infer, though falsely,
that it was not licit for us to declare or enact the things before mentioned.
Again, because the constitution Ad conditorem canonum,
against the before mentioned definitions, asserts that the Brothers
Minor cannot have in any thing simple use of fact, they try,
similarly, to conclude against it.
[3] However, it is evidently clear from the following
that the premiss of the above argument--namely, that those things
which through the key of knowledge the supreme pontiffs have once
defined in faith and morals it is not lawful for a successor to call
again into doubt, or affirm the contrary, though it is otherwise
(they say) with things ordained by supreme pontiffs through the key
of power--is entirely contrary to truth.
First, indeed, according to those who hold that the
spiritual key is by no means knowledge, but the power to bind and
loose, it is clear that the before mentioned assertors, in stating
that it is knowledge, have erred. The definition the learned give of
the key supports them [i.e. those who hold that the key is power]:
"The key is a special power of binding and loosing, by which the
ecclesiastical judge should admit the worthy, and exclude the
unworthy from the Kingdom".
Again, because the keys of which we speak are given in
the conferring of the priestly order; but it is
certain that knowledge is generally not conferred on one ordained to
the priesthood: therefore, according to them, it seems that knowledge
is not a key, but only the power to bind and loose should be called a key.
Besides, according to those [a] who say that the one
spiritual key is knowledge, and according to those [b] who assert
that authority to distinguish "between leprosy and leprosy"
[Deut. 17] is one key and another [key] is the power to bind and
loose, they are known evidently to have erred.
-
For they suppose that something can be defined by some
constitution through such keys [of knowledge] concerning matters
which are of faith, and other matters [i.e. of morals]. But the keys
which are conferred in the priestly order do not extend to such
things; otherwise it would follow that simple priests could make a
constitution about the foregoing, which is evidently false.
But if they mean that those keys extend to the general
power given in the commission of the pastoral office to
blessed Peter, and in his person to his successors (a
commission which indeed evidently seems to have granted them
everything without which universal pastoral care cannot suitably take
place or the office be discharged), again it is clear that they have
erred. For they say that things enacted by the key of knowledge and
those enacted by the key of power (supposing that some things are
enacted, or even defined, by the key of knowledge and others by the
key of power) have different effects [the former immutable, the
latter not]. This is evidently false. For
-
through the key of knowledge, or through the authority
to distinguish or examine between leprosy and leprosy (if we say that
that is a key), nothing else is attributed to him to whom it is given
except authority {cognoscere} to examine. But
- to someone given authority to
examine concerning some thing, [authority] to define that thing is
not understood to be given [see gloss. col.159, d].
It remains, therefore, that for suitably enacting or
defining anything, both keys--namely of knowing and of examining--are
necessarily required; or that to enact, and also to define, belongs
solely to the key of power; but just as physical light directs the
key bearer in using a physical key, also, as it were, for this
purpose knowledge is the counterpart of light. Our Saviour in the
promise of the keys ["and I will give you the keys"] made
to blessed Peter seems expressly to have thought this, since he added
immediately after it: "And whatever you will bind upon earth
will be bound also in heaven, and whatever you will loose upon earth
will be loosed also in heaven"--making no mention of knowledge.
[4] What is afterwards put forward in the above
argument--namely that in the confirmation and explanation of the rule
of the Brothers Minor given by some of our predecessors, namely
Honorius III, Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Alexander IV and Nicholas IV,
the following words are contained, "This is the gospel
rule", etc., quoted above, up to "clearly consisted also
solely in bare use of fact"--altogether contradicts the truth. Honorius,
indeed, confirmed that rule without any explanation, and in his
confirmation there is no mention of the above words, as can be
apparent to anyone who looks into his confirmation: except insofar as
the gospel life is mentioned in the confirmed rule itself, when it
says, "This is the rule of the Brothers Minor, namely to observe
the holy Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, by living in obedience,
without property, and in chastity". It cannot be inferred from
these words that this predecessor of ours defined the things that
they assert in the above words [namely, that Christ and the Apostles
had nothing]. Indeed, it can be inferred rather that the Gospel life
lived by Christ and the Apostles did not exclude
some possessions in common, since living "without property"
does not require that those living thus should have nothing in common.
In the explanations also of the before mentioned
Gregory, Innocent and Alexander, who explain the same rule without
other confirmation, there is similarly no mention at all of the above
[words]; indeed it is shown evidently by means of those
[explanations] that of the things it is licit for these Brothers to
possess, use of right [not simple use of fact]
belongs to the order itself.
-
Indeed on this matter Gregory
inserted in his explanation the following: "We say that they
should have property neither individually nor in common; but let the
order have the use of the equipment, books and movable things which
it is licit to have, and let the Brothers use these things according
as the minister general and provincials think should be ordered".
- Innocent and Alexander before
mentioned said in their explanations: "We say, moreover, that
since it is contained expressly in the Rule that the Brothers should
not appropriate anything to themselves, neither house, nor place, nor
any thing, that they should not have property either in common or
individually; but let the order have the use of the places, houses,
equipment, books, and things it is licit to have, and let the
Brothers use them according as the general and provincial ministers
think should be ordered".
For when it is said in the above explanations that the
order should have the use of the foregoing things, this must refer to
use of right. Facts, indeed, which are of singulars, need
and require a true person: but an Order is not a true person but must
rather be regarded as a represented and imaginary person. Those
things which are of fact therefore cannot truly befit it, though
things which are of right can suit it. [See gloss, col.161, q-y] [5]
Besides, although the explanation of the said Nicholas IV
contains the following: "These [the Franciscans] are thos e
professors of the holy Rule [of St Francis] who are founded on the
Gospel words, strengthened by the example of Christ's life, and
confirmed by the words and deeds of his Apostles, the founders of the
Church militant". Afterwards in the same explanation he added
that "the renunciation for God's sake of ownership, both
individual and common, of all things is meritorious and holy: Christ
also, showing the way of perfection, taught this by word and
confirmed it by example; and the first founders of the Church
militant, as they had drawn it from the source himself, directed it
through the channels of their teaching and lives to those who wished
to live perfectly".
But from the above words it can by no means be
inferred that it was the intention of our predecessor above
mentioned, Nicholas, to say that the said Rule is, in respect of everything
contained in it, founded on the Gospel words and strengthened by the
example of Christ's life, or that it is confirmed by the life and
deeds of the Apostles. For it is certain that many things are
contained in the said Rule which neither Christ's word taught nor his
example confirmed--for example, what the founder of the Rule
prescribes to all the Brothers, that they should in no way receive a
penny or money, either directly or by means of a go-between, nor also
many other things contained in the said Rule that indeed neither
Christ nor the Apostles taught in words nor confirmed by example.
It is no objection that Christ forbad the Apostles and
disciples to carry money when he sent them to preach (this, however,
we read was forbidden to them before he sent them). Gospel truth and
apostolic sayings testify in many places that they carried money
after they returned. Further, Augustine says explicitly that [not to
carry money] was not a precept but a power of receiving necessaries
from those to whom they preached the gospel; it was licit for the
Apostles to observe this [i.e. to receive necessaries], or, also, not
to observe it.
But our predecessor the Roman pontiff Nicholas, in the
explanation above mentioned, seems to have meant to say this [that it
is founded on the Gospel words etc.] in respect of the three main
vows--namely to live in obedience, without property, and in
chastity--and other things in the said Rule that are found explicitly
in the Gospel, if there are any. This indeed does not conflict in any
respect with our declarations above mentioned.
Besides, it does not seem that he said that the
sustenance of Christ and his apostles consisted solely in bare simple
use of fact, since in his explanation our predecessor above
mentioned, Nicholas, made no mention of Christ and the Apostles.
Indeed he seems to have thought explicitly enough that they were able
to have a right (different from ownership), since the above
explanation, as far as it concerns them [Christ and the Apostles],
mentions only renunciation of ownership and not any other right.
Besides, the same Nicholas our predecessor seems to
have thought that Christ and the Apostles had something in common
even in respect of ownership. For when in his explanation above
mentioned he had said the words above concerning renunciation of
owner ship, answering a tacit objection that could be made to him
about the bag which we read in the Gospel [Jn 13:29] that Christ had,
he immediately added the following: "Neither let anyone think to
object to these things that it is sometimes said that Christ had a
bag." For Christ himself, whose works are perfect, practised in
his actions the way of perfection in such a way that sometimes,
condescending to the imperfection of the weak, he both extolled the
way of perfection and did not condemn the weak ways of the
imperfect". And in this way he asserts that Christ, in [owning]
a bag, took on the person of the weak.
Otherwise, if he did not mean that Christ had the bag
even in the sense of ownership, the objection concerning the bag
would have been irrelevant. Moreover, if it were said that Christ had
in the bag only simple use of fact, it would be pointless to say that
Christ had that bag "in the person of the weak", since,
according to him [Nicholas], to have simple use of fact befits the
perfect also. And if one asks, for the sake of which of the weak did
he have the bag?, Augustine, whose statement has been inserted into
the Decretum [12, q.1, Habebat Dominus],
answers: "The Lord had a bag keeping safe the offerings of the
faithful, and distributed them for their [the disciples'] necessities
and to other poor persons". Whence it is certain that he thought
this [that they were weak] of his disciples.
And this, to have some things in common in respect of
ownership, does not derogate from the highest poverty, according to
the statement of the before mentioned Gregory IX. In a certain
decretal of his he says expressly that the Preaching Brothers and the
Brothers Minor serve Christ the poor man "in the highest
poverty"; and yet it is certain that the preachers have some
things in common even in respect of ownership, which does not
conflict with their Rule and state.
Alexander, also, our predecessor
above mentioned, seems to have thought this in his condemnation of a
pamphlet published against the state of the Preachers and Minors.
Somewhere in this condemnation speaking about the said Brothers he
added the following, when in addition he answers that these brothers
have abandoned everything for God's sake, "begging the meagre
maintenance of life, let them imitate Christ the poor man by
embracing Gospel perfection. On account of this it evidently appears
that they are not only in the state of those to be saved, but even of
the perfect, and that by the observance of their way of life, which
indeed follows the model of Gospel perfection itself, they earn
excelling glory as the reward of eternal recompense". Here
indeed he says explicitly that the Preachers imitate Christ the poor
man, and that they embrace Gospel perfection, and are in the state of
the perfect, and that observance of their Rule follows the model of
Gospel perfection; and yet it is certain that according to their Rule
they [i.e. the Order of Preachers] can have some things in common
even in respect of ownership.
Neither is it an objection when they say, that
Innocent (otherwise Celestine) V, our predecessor, said that high
poverty is to have few things of one's own, for God's sake, higher
poverty that which has nothing of one's own, but has in common; the
highest that which has nothing in this world either individually or
in common. We say, indeed, that he said this not as pope, but as
Brother Peter of Tarantasia in a certain postill of his; the sayings
of the above mentioned supreme pontiffs should therefore rightly be
preferred to it.
They say also that the Apostle is speaking of such
highest poverty, when he says: "And their highest poverty
overflowed in the riches of their simplicity" [2 Cor. 8:2] This
is evidently false, because there he is speaking of the poverty of
the Macedonians, who held temporal goods even individually,
concerning whom the Apostle asserts that beyond their means they had
sent alms to the saints.
[6] What is said to be contained in the explanation of
our predecessor Nicholas, however, that the Brothers Minor have only
simple use of fact in the things that come to them, we say that if he
meant simple use of fact devoid of all right, so that the Brothers
themselves or the Order would have no right of using, this is
explicitly against the declaration of our predecessors, the supreme
pontiffs Gregory, Innocent, and Alexander above mentioned, in which
it is explicitly contained that the Order has the use of such things:
this must necessarily be understood of use of right, as has been
proved above.
Besides, we say that this is impossible, namely that
simple use of fact without any right (which can properly be called
nothing else than the [act of] using {uti} itself) can be held by
anyone in any thing, even one not consumable by use, as has been
proved in the decretal Ad conditorem canonum, and as
Augustine explicitly holds concerning an act in [Confessions]
book 11.
Further, if anyone could have simple use, devoid of
every right, it is certain that such an act of using would have to be
regarded as not-just, since a person would have used to whom no right
of using belonged. But a not-just use does not by any means pertain
to a state of perfection and adds nothing to perfection, but rather
is manifestly known to conflict with it. Now it does not seem
probable that the enacter of the canon meant to reserve such not-just
use to the Brothers themselves.
Indeed, that he was referring to a just use can appear
more evidently from this, that in the same enactment he adds that he
was taking to himself and also to the Roman Church the lordship
precisely of those things of which it was licit for
the Brothers, or for the Order above mentioned, to have use of fact,
adding that those Brothers should not have use of all things [e.g.
not of money]: but as far as relates to simple use of fact without
any right of using, no difference of things can be assigned {censeri}
in respect of the Brothers, for de facto they can use
prohibited things just as they can things permitted. From this it
follows that the use of fact of which this enactment speaks should be
understood of such use as is just and for which there belongs a right
of using. And the enacter of the canon himself seems also to have
thought this, since in the same enactment he added that a moderate
use of things previously paid out {in expensis prius rebus} has been
granted to the Brothers.
[7] Again, those who attack these constitutions are
said {perhibentur] to assert publicly that supreme pontiffs have
condemned the pamphlet and statements of the masters who asserted
that the said poverty and life of the said Brothers was not
evangelical and apostolic, strictly prohibiting by apostolic letter
anyone from presuming to assert contumaciously the foregoing
[statements], or any of them, or to defend them in any way: providing
that anyone presuming to the contrary should be regarded as
contumacious, as a rebel against the Roman Church, and as a heretic.
To this we say that such an assertion is false. For it
is not contained in the sentence above mentioned that anyone going
against it should be regarded as a heretic. In this respect it
contains indeed the following: "For we likewise {nihilominus} by
the authority of this document strictly forbid anyone to presume to
assert pertinaciously or to defend in any way the foregoing
[statements], or any of them. But whoever presumes to do so, let him
be regarded by all the faithful as contumacious and as a rebel
against the Roman Church". It was not added that he should be
regarded as a heretic, as is clear in the text of the above sentence
of condemnation.
[8] Again, such assertors are said to have asserted
publicly that 'renunciation for God's sake of a right in the
ownership of any thing whatever, and in its use, is holy and
meritorious, and was observed by Christ himself, and imposed on his
Apostles, and undertaken by them under vow. But use of fact by Christ
and the Apostles for the sustenance of nature is not on this account
proved to be not just; but it is the more just, perfect, acceptable
to God, and exemplary for the world, the more fully every right has
been renounced by which a person using thus can in any way contend or
litigate in court for such a use'. This assertion indeed contains
many falsities, since Gospel or apostolic history does not teach that
Christ observed in himself the above mentioned renunciation of every
right in the ownership of every thing whatever and in its use, or
that he imposed it on the Apostles, or that they accepted it under
vow; rather, it evidently manifests the opposite.
What is added in the above assertion, however, that by
the renunciation of the above mentioned right, namely of property,
the use of fact for the sustenance of nature is not proved in Christ
and the Apostles to be not just, but is the more just, etc., includes
an impossibility, and this statement is evidently an error. For it is
impossible for an external human act to be just if the one who does
it has no right to do it: indeed, such use is necessarily proved to
be not just, but unjust. Again, it is absurd and erroneous that the
act of someone who does not have a right to do such an act should be
more just and more acceptable to God than the act of one who has such
a right, since it implies that an unjust act is more just and more
acceptable to God than a just act would be.
[9] From the foregoing, however, they try to infer (it
is reported) that the definition of the above mentioned supreme
pontiffs which they defined concerning the poverty of Christ and the
Apostles and the Rule of the above mentioned Brothers Minor (as
quoted above) could not be changed by us. Without doubt they assert
falsehoods when they say that our predecessors defined such things,
as has been proved above, and again when they speak in this way, when
they try to attack our constitutions by such means, they show (if
their false assertions were true) that the constitutions by which
they support themselves would be invalid, erroneous and infirm.
For if it was not licit for us to enact anything
common contrary to the constitution of our predecessor Nicholas IV,
on which they chiefly base themselves, neither was it licit for him
to enact or declare anything contrary to the enactments of the above
mentioned Gregory, Innocent and Alexander; but that he did so
(according to their assertion) is evidently known. For since they
[Gregory, etc.] declared that the Order of Minors had use of those
things which it is licit for them to have--which must necessarily
refer to use of right, as was proved above--but he himself (according
to them) enacted that neither the Order nor the Brothers have a right
of using but only simple use of fact, and further ordered, decreed
and enacted that precisely this his constitution, ordinance and
declaration must by the Brothers themselves be observed exactly and
inviolably for all times, it is certain not only that he made an
ordinance contrary to the declarations of his predecessors above
mentioned, but that he also revoked them, in respect of the things
his own declaration contains.
In his declaration that predecessor [Nicholas] of ours
also added that the explanation and ordering of them and of those
things he had explained belonged to the Apostolic See, saying:
"If in these matter any doubt should arise..., let it be brought
to the summit of the Apostolic See, that its meaning in this matter
should be made manifest by its apostolic authority, to which alone it
has been granted to make laws in these matters, and to explain those
that have been made". But these assertors assert the opposite of this.
Besides, it is clear that what they assert is false.
For although the above mentioned Innocent III in general council
forbad the establishment of new religious orders, yet we read that
his successors (notwithstanding this prohibition) confirmed many
Orders, which also (with some exceptions) were afterwards definitely
dissolved by our predecessor Gregory IX in general council. If,
therefore, it was licit, after the prohibition of a general council,
for supreme pontiffs to confirm unconfirmed orders and for their
successors to dissolve completely the orders thus confirmed, it is
not surprising if it is licit for his successors to explain, or
otherwise to change, what a supreme pontiff alone [without a council]
declares or orders concerning the Rules of Orders. But it is clear
that neither the above mentioned Honorius, nor Gregory, nor
Alexander, nor Nicholas made their confirmation in a general council,
since none of them held a general council. Although Innocent IV held
a general council, yet his above mentioned declaration was not made
in it or by the authority of any [general] council. Nicholas IV
neither held a general council nor made any declaration concerning
the said Rule. Gregory IX above mentioned neither confirmed nor
explained the said Rule, but in a general council where some
mendicant Orders were annulled, he did not annul the Orders of the
said Brothers Minor and the Preachers, but asserted that they were
approved, saying: "We do not allow this present constitution to
be extended to those which the evident utility coming from them to
the universal Church asserts {perhibet} that they have been approved".
[10] Further, let them tell us where they read such
assertions, that it pertains to faith or morals that Christ and the
Apostles had in the things they had only simple use of fact? Indeed,
this pertains to faith neither directly, since there is no article
about this nor any under which it can be comprehended--as is clear in
the creeds, in which the articles of faith are contained--nor, also,
[does it pertain to faith] reductively, as if scripture contains
something like this, so that if it be denied the whole of sacred
scripture is made doubtful and as a consequence the articles of
faith, which have to be proved by sacred scripture, are made doubtful
and uncertain. For this cannot be found in sacred scripture, but
rather its opposite. But concerning the above mentioned Brothers
Minor it is certain that there is in the above mentioned Creeds, in
the Gospel, in the Acts of the Apostles, and in the Epistles, no
mention to be found concerning their poverty and simple use of fact,
or concerning the lordship of the things offered to them, which the
supreme Pontiff reserved or shall have been able to reserve to
himself and to the Roman Church, and which once reserved it is not
licit for a successor to renounce (if this seems appropriate), or
that the successor can not recall the procurators established by the
authority of a supreme pontiff for the business {negotiis} of the
said Order. Whence they cannot infer from the above, except falsely,
anything that implies that a successor cannot order some thing else
contrary to orders made concerning such things by supreme pontiffs.
The above mentioned Nicholas explicitly inserted this in his
declaration, as is more fully contained above [section 9].
[11] Lest the fabricators of such lies, and also the
assertors of such pestiferous, erroneous and condemned doctrine,
worthy indeed of all confutation and confusion, should be able to
glory, and to draw others into error, since by boldness, stealth and
wicked impudence they have dared to defend publicly and approve even
a heresy condemned by the above mentioned constitution [Cum inter],
namely that Christ and his apostles had, in the things we read they
had, only simple use of fact without any right, from which (if it
were true) it would follow that Christ's use was not just, which
certainly contains blasphemy, and something inimical to the Catholic
faith, since there is no doubt this has proceeded from pertinacious
and erroneous animosity: of each and every one who, in word or in
writing, personally or through another or others, has presumed [to
assert] such things publicly, and also of those who taught them in
such matters and caused them to do the foregoing, we therefore
declare, with the advice of our brothers [the Cardinals], that they
have fallen into condemned heresy, and that they must be avoided as
heretics. But if anyone henceforth knowingly presumes to defend or
approve, in word or in writing, the heresies, or either of them
condemned by the constitution Cum inter, with the advice
of the same brothers [the Cardinals] we decree that he is to be
regarded evidently by all as a heretic. Besides, since, as it is
reported, they have tried with mad acts of boldness to attack our
constitution above mentioned Ad conditorem canonum, we
strictly forbid, with the advice of the same brothers, that anyone
should knowingly, in word or in writing, approve or defend anything
contrary to the things defined, ordered or done by it. But if anyone
presumes to the contrary, let him be regarded by all as contumacious
and as a rebel against the Roman Church. To no one, therefore, etc.
[as in Execrabilis]. Given at Avignon 10th November in
the ninth year of our pontificate [1324]. |