Papal documents relating to Franciscan poverty Nicholas III, Exiit qui seminat (1279) Clement V, Exivi de paradiso (1312) Quorundam exigit (in progress) Quia nonnunquam (1322) John XXII, Ad conditorem canonum (1322) John XXII, Cum inter nonnullos (1323) John XXII, Quia quorundam (1324) John XXII, Quia vir reprobus (1329) Return to Studies in medieval and early modern intellectual history	POPE JOHN XXII, QUIA VIR REPROBUS Translated by John Kilcullen and John Scott (Translated, with the publisher's permission, from H.S. Offler's edition of Ockham's Opus nonaginta dierum in Guillelmi de Ockham, Opera Politica, vols. 1 and 2 (Manchester University Press). The paragraphs correspond to the chapters of Ockham's work.) Copyright (c) 1996, 1998, R.J. Kilcullen, J.R. Scott. [1] John, bishop, servant of the servants of God, for permanent record of the matter. Because a wicked man, Michael of Cesena, formerly Minister General of the Order of Friars Minor, who has for his excesses been removed by us on the advice of our Brothers [the Cardinals] from the office of that Ministry, and has been rendered incapable, as justice demands, of obtaining any dignities or offices, "having turned aside to vain babbling, understanding neither what he says nor the things about which he makes assertion" [1 Timothy 1:6], broke out into the insanity of trying to attack in many ways three of our constitutions---namely Ad conditorem canonum, Cum inter, and Quia quorundam---asserting, among other things, that what the constitution Cum inter asserted as catholic is heretical, and that what that constitution declared heretical is catholic; and, so that his insanity should be known to more people, he has with punishable temerity attempted to send his pamphlets containing these attacks to various parts of the world and centres of study, and to have them affixed to Church doors and other public places: for these and his many other excesses he has been declared, as justice demands, on the advice of those same Brothers, a supporter of heretics, and a heretic, as is contained in greater detail in our sentences. Although these attacks are so notoriously unsound as to be not worth answering, nevertheless, because in them he takes weapons from the law against the law, and attacks the Gospel from the Gospel, and creating lies from truths calls truth to support a lie, in case his erroneous and heretical sayings are able to corrupt the hearts of simple people, I have thought that brief answer should be made to his criticisms, as follows. [2] In the first place, then, this heretic tries to attack the constitution Ad conditorem canonum because, "intending to prove that the Friars Minor, professing to live without property in things that are consumed by being used, are not to be regarded as simple users," the constitution asserts the following: "To say that use of right or of fact separate from ownership or lordship can be established2 in such things as are consumed by use conflicts with law and goes against reason . . . In things consumable by use neither a right of using nor a use of fact separate from ownership or lordship of the thing can be established or had."3 These are the words of the constitution, which, so this heretic says, "clearly go against sacred Scripture, the sacred canons and definitions of the holy doctors, and also the decisions of the holy Roman Church. That they conflict with sacred Scripture is proved clearly from Chapters 2 and 4 of Acts. For in Chapter 2 it is said: 'All the believers were together and had all things common. They sold their possessions and property and distributed them to individuals as each had need' [Acts 2:44-5]. In Chapter 4 it is written: 'The multitude of believers were of one heart and soul, and none of them said that anything he possessed was his . . . Nor was there among them anyone in want. For those who possessed fields and houses sold them and brought the proceeds of the things they sold and put it at the feet of the apostles. They distributed to individuals as each had need . . . They broke bread in their homes, and took food with rejoicing' [Acts 4:32-46]. The word 'his' the saints explain thus: 'His, that is proper [belonging exclusively to him],' as is clear in 12, q. 1, c. Scimus, c. Nolo, and c. Non dicatis, and para. Sic ergo, and in Augustine's Rule (near the beginning). And the ordinary gloss on the words 'they had all things common' says: 'It is a sign of brotherly love to possess all things and have nothing proper [exclusive to oneself].' [2.23] These words," so this heretic says, "clearly suggest that the believers did not have ownership of any temporal thing, whether consumable by use or not consumable by use. [2.25] For they sold their things not consumable by use---namely possessions, fields, houses, and property (gloss: 'that is, flocks')---and did not keep them, either individually or in their community; and those [2.27] things which the law (Institutes, de usufructu, para. Constituitur [Institutes 2.4.2]) says are consumable by use---namely monies taken as the price of things sold and bread (particularly mentioned here)---they had in common, and they 'distributed to individuals as each had need'; and 'none of them said that anything was his,' that is, proper, but 'among them all things were common.' [2.31] Thus each of them had use of things consumable by use without ownership and lordship"---that is, separate from ownership and lordship. From this he concludes that [2.33] "the assertion and teaching contained in the constitution goes against divine Scripture and destroys and confounds every religious order that has a vow renouncing the ownership of temporal things, for it implies that when any religious used things consumable by use, he would have to be regarded as an owner." These are the words of this heretic, which undoubtedly include many falsehoods. We will answer them in what follows. [3] For we say that what that constitution teaches and asserts is true, namely that in things consumable by use neither a right of using nor use itself can be established or had; but although neither a right of using nor use itself can be had or established in those things, one can, as this constitution says, use them up [abuti].11 According to the constitution, "'To use up', when things consumable by use are being discussed, means to consume the thing". That a right of using cannot be established for such things the constitution proves from the definition of use: "Use is the right of using another's things, preserving their substance"---that is, the right of taking, in one's own name, in whole or in part, the fruits or other utility which can come from the thing in which the use is established. But it is certain that in things consumable by use, as long as their substance is preserved and remains whole, no utility can come---for example, bread and wine, from which no fruit or utility can be gathered or had while the substance of the thing is preserved. It clearly follows, therefore, that in things consumable by use a right of using separate from ownership or lordship of the thing cannot be established or had. [3.14] By means of this proposition blessed John Chrysostom explains why usury cannot licitly be taken---as a price for the lease of a house or other thing not consumable by use can be---for money lent. He says that in a thing not consumable by use, such as a house or field, anyone who has it does not have only ownership or lordship, but takes fruit or other utility from it, preserving the substance of the thing and the ownership and lordship of it. This is clear in the case of a house in which he lives, and thus has from it the benefit of a habitation, while lordship of the house remains preserved to him. From a field also, he takes the fruits of the field, the substance of the thing being preserved and the lordship remaining. And therefore, because the lessor, keeping lordship for himself, grants to the lessee the fruit or other utility deriving from the thing, and at the end of the lease does not reclaim those things, namely the fruits or utility of the house or field, it is not surprising that he can take a price for them. But the lender of money transfers the lordship of the money to the borrower, not some fruit or other utility which can come from it preserving the substance of the thing; and he afterwards reclaims from the borrower exactly the same amount. Consequently, he cannot licitly take from the borrower anything beyond what was lent, as we read in dist. 88, c. Eiciens. That use itself cannot be had by anyone the constitution clearly proves, following the opinion of Augustine in his Confessions: because "what does not exist cannot be had"; but the act of using does not exist in reality, neither before one uses, nor after one has used, nor while one is actually using, as the constitution argues more at length; it follows therefore that it cannot be had. [4] In answer to his statement that the sacred Scriptures quoted above [Acts, Chapters 2 and 4] "clearly suggest that the believers had no ownership of any temporal thing, either consumable by use or not consumable by use" [2. 23-], we say: If he means that no believer had individual ownership, what he says is true, in respect of the time of which the Scripture speaks; because Acts 4[:32-] says explicitly "None of them said that anything he possessed was his." But if he means (as he does mean, as is quite clear from what he puts forward later) that the believers had no ownership of anything even in common, he expressly contradicts these Scriptures, since they say21 that "to them", that is to the believers, "all things which they possessed were common" among themselves. [4.10] That this "being common" should be understood in respect of lordship or ownership is plain from the fact that what had been proper to them earlier, before the conversion of the Jews, was made common among them after they became believers. But it is certain that the things they possessed before their conversion were proper to them in respect of lordship; for otherwise they could not make them common. It follows, therefore, that they were made common among them in respect of ownership or lordship. The Scripture of Acts 4 clearly says this, unless violence is done to it, of things not consumable by use. For after it has said, "None of them said that anything he possessed was his", it continues a little later, "Nor was there among them anyone in want", and to explain why it adds, "For those who possessed fields and houses sold them and brought the proceeds . . . at the Apostles' feet" (etc.). Since, therefore, it first says that all things were common among the believers and afterwards adds that fields and houses were sold, it clearly appears that those things had been made common before they were sold; for otherwise it would follow that they remained proper to those to whom they had belonged before, and consequently that they had remained owners before the sale: whereas the Scripture says the opposite when it says, "None of them said that anything he possessed was his". [5] Wishing to prove that the believers did not have lordship even in common in things not consumable by use, he adds: "For they sold things not consumable by use, and did not keep them either individually or in their community" [2.25]. To this we say that it does not follow from this that they did not have lordship of those things before the sale, but it does indeed follow that they did not keep it after the sale. And that is true. For by the completed sale they transferred lordship to the buyers, [5.7] and therefore did not keep it themselves. [5.8] And if it is asked why the Apostles did not keep fields and houses in Judea, but rather, after selling them, had the proceeds in common, Pope Melchiades answers. He says, "The Apostles foresaw that the Church was going to be among"---that is, would pass over to---"the gentiles; for that reason they did not obtain estates in Judea". And if it be said that Melchiades seems to suppose that even before the sale of estates the believers did not have them in common, since he says that they did not "obtain" them in Judea, we say that Melchiades said that the Apostles did not obtain estates in Judea for the reason that they did not obtain them in such a way that they were intending to keep them for themselves; and therefore they seem not to have obtained them, since if someone obtains a thing in such a way that he should immediately renounce it, he is not said in the proper sense to have "obtained" it. From the above it is clear that it was permissible for the Apostles to keep estates in Judea, if they had wished, and they were not compelled not to keep them by vow, but by their own choice, because they foresaw that they would not prolong their stay there but would pass over to the gentiles. [6] Subsequently he says that the believers had "things . . . consumable by use . . . in common, and so each of them had use of fact of things consumable by use" [2.27-]. To this we say that if he means that they were common to them in respect of ownership or lordship, what he says is true; but if he means that they were not common in respect of ownership or lordship but only in respect of simple use of fact, we say that he errs and contradicts the above---quoted sacred Scripture. That this Scripture demonstratively supposes that things consumable by use were common to the believers in respect of ownership or lordship is clear. For it says that "to them", that is to the believers, "all things were common"; and since someone who says "all" excludes nothing, it follows that that statement covers also things consumable by use. I ask, therefore, in respect of what were those goods "common" to them? Either this heretic will say either that they were common in respect of use of fact, or in respect of the right of using, or usufruct, or possession, or in respect of lordship or ownership. For these, according to the decretal Exiit, are generally found in temporal things,26 which is true in things not consumable by use. Now it can by no means be said that these things, that is things consumable by use, were "common" in respect of simple use of fact. [6.17] First, because in such things, that is, things consumable by use, use of fact in the proper sense of "use" has no place; for "use" in the proper sense requires that with that use the substance of the thing be preserved, as is clear from what was said earlier [3.7-8]; and in things consumable by use this cannot be. Also, because use of fact is proper to the user in such a way that it cannot be said to be another's, or communicable to another; for it is clear that Peter's act of eating was proper to him in such a way that it could not be said to be common to others; for this reason the being "common" cannot be understood in respect of simple use of fact. Again, because a community cannot have use of fact, since such use requires a true person, which a community is not, but is rather a person imaginary or represented.27 Further, it cannot be said that this being "common" can be spoken of in respect of the right of using or usufruct, since in such things, that is things consumable by use, these rights, that is the right of using or usufruct, cannot be established, as is clear from their definitions, set out in the constitution Ad conditorem canonum. Also, this being "common" cannot be said in respect of possession. For if we are speaking of the possession which is a right, that being common could not, according to him, exist among believers, since he [the appellant] himself asserts that the Apostles had no right in these temporal things but only simple use of fact. But if we are speaking of the possession which is of fact, such possession is proper to each possessor in such a way that it is not common to any, or even communicable, as was said above of use of fact. It follows, therefore, that the things consumable by use which were made common among them were made so in respect of ownership and lordship. [7] With respect to what that heretic afterwards says, namely, "Thus each of them had the use of things consumable by use without lordship and ownership, or separate from lordship and ownership" [2.31-], we say that he infers this from the false supposition he had made before. For he had said above that things consumable by use were common among believers only in respect of simple use of fact; and from this he infers that each of them had use of fact of things consumable by use without lordship and ownership; accordingly, since the premise is false (namely that things consumable by use were common among the believers only in respect of simple use of fact---rather they were common in respect of lordship or ownership, as was proved above [6.6-]), it is clear that what he infers from it is false---namely that in such things each of them had simple use of fact. Further, its falsity is clear from another argument, because use of fact cannot be "had" by anyone, as was shown above [8] To this heretic's statement that "this teaching"---namely, that in things consumable by use, use of right or of fact separate from ownership or lordship cannot be established or had---"destroys and confounds every religious order that has a vow renouncing the ownership of temporal things, it implies that when any religious used things consumable by use, he would have to be regarded as an owner" [2.33-], we say that he plainly lies. For all religious orders, except that of blessed Francis, whose members are bound to live without ownership, acknowledge that they can have according to their rules, and also do have, things both consumable by use and not consumable by use, in respect of ownership and lordship in common, though some have decided to restrict their rules by adding statutes to them in respect of some immovables. The members of these orders cannot be said to use things consumable by use if "use" is taken properly, as was proved above [6.17-]; but they can consume such things, for example by eating bread and drinking wine and so on. But from the act of consuming such things they should not be accounted owners, because they should be said to consume them not as their own but as common things, and the act of consuming such things is by no means separated from common lordship: just as, if two who have bread in common ate it without dividing it, neither would on this account become the owner of the bread he ate and each would be said to have eaten not his own but the common bread. [9] It seems also that it can probably be said that after the distribution of goods consumable by use which was made among the Apostles and other believers, as is related in Acts 2 and 4, each could be called owner and lord of the share assigned to him. The Scripture of Acts 4:[34-5] seems explicitly to suppose this, when it says: "Nor was there among them anyone in want"; and it gives the reason why this was so, adding: "For those who possessed fields and houses sold them and brought the proceeds of the things they sold and put it at the feet of the Apostles. They distributed to individuals as each had need". Therefore, when it says "There was no one in want", because "they divided to individuals as each had need", it plainly supposes that whatever was given separately to each was the property of each. For "to divide" is to give separately to certain persons various parts of some thing. Since, therefore things that belonged to the sustenance of human life were given by those who had power to give, namely the Apostles, to those who had power to receive, it seems that each will have been the lord of the share assigned to him. Otherwise, unless after the division they had more in the share assigned to them than they had before, the statement would not seem true that there was no one in need. Further, it is certain that everyday clothes count among things consumable by use. [9.17] And after the sharing mentioned in the Acts 4 quoted above, we read in Acts that an angel said to Peter, "Gird yourself, put on your sandals" [Acts 12:8]; again, he said to him, "Put on your garment", etc. [ibid.]: here clearly the angel supposes that the sandals and garment assigned to Peter were in respect of lordship properly Peter's. It therefore seems that money, bread, wine, clothes and other things consumable by use separately assigned to him for the sustenance of life were similarly his. A vow of living without any ownership does not seem to extend to such things as human life necessarily requires. Further, from Acts 4 it cannot be proved that the believers were not able licitly to receive some of those common goods from the division made by the Apostles and hold them as property. For with respect to this the above Scripture adds nothing else except what follows: "The multitude of the believers were of one heart and soul, and none of them said that anything he possessed was his, but among them all things were common" [Acts 4:32]. From these words it seems that they had renounced the lordship of all things which they possessed and had transferred it to the community. But they do not seem to have bound themselves so that, if something were given them from the common goods for the sustenance of their life, they could not accept it and keep it as property. Indeed that Scripture clearly enough supposes this, when it says, "They distributed to individuals as each had need": as was said before, to divide is to give to certain persons various parts of some thing. [10] Again, to prove that the assertion that in things consumed by use one can not have use separated from lordship conflicts with sacred Scripture, he [the appellant] quotes what Peter said to the Lord, Matthew 19[:27]: "See, we have left everything and followed you". According to him, "This cannot be understood to mean that the Apostles left everything in respect of use, because it is certain from sacred Scripture that they afterwards used things consumable by use; therefore they left everything, both consumable and not consumable by use, in respect of lordship and ownership: as is proved", he says, "by 12, q. 1, c. Dilectissimis, for if someone says 'everything', he excepts nothing. And St. Gregory, on the text 'Leaving their nets', says that 'he has left much, who has kept nothing for himself, and who---however little it may be---has abandoned all'. Therefore, to say that the use of things consumed by use cannot be separated from ownership and lordship, conflicts with and fights against sacred Scripture. [10.12] And this is confirmed", he says, "because the Apostles vowed the renunciation of all things, according to Augustine in Book XVII of The City of God ; [10.14] at their example religious (who follow the Apostles' pattern, as is said in 16, q. 1, c. Ex auctoritate) vow the renunciation of all temporal things": not, however, in respect of use; therefore it follows, according to him, that "the Apostles vowed, and religious vow, the renunciation of the lordship and ownership of all things, consumable by use and not consumable by use". These are his words. [11] To this it must be said that from the words, "See, we have left everything", etc., it cannot be inferred that they left them in respect of lordship or ownership. For we find these words said of Peter, James and John in Luke 5[:11], where it is said that "landing their boats, leaving everything they followed him"; and yet, after these words, we read in Matthew 4[:18-20] that "Jesus walking by the sea of Galilee saw Peter and Andrew casting their nets into the sea, and said to them, 'Come after me, and I will make you fishers of men', and immediately, leaving their nets, they followed him"; and Augustine says explicitly in his book The Harmony of the Gospels that the statement in Luke 5 preceded what is said in Matthew 4. Again, after what we read in Matthew 4, we find in Matthew 8[:14] that "Jesus came to Peter's house"; therefore the house had still remained Peter's. Again in Matthew 26[:51-2] we read that "one of these who were with Jesus", namely Peter, as is said in John 18[:10], "drew his sword, and striking the chief priest's slave cut off his ear. Jesus said to him, 'Put up your sword into its place'"; therefore the sword was Peter's. Again, in Luke 22[:36] it is said to Peter and the other Apostles, "Whoever has a wallet let him take it, and likewise a bag also; and whoever does not have one", namely a sword, "let him sell his cloak, and let him buy a sword". Again, in Acts 12[:8], the angel says to Peter, "Gird yourself, put on your sandals". Again, he said to him, "Put on your garment and follow me". In these passages sacred Scripture clearly supposes that, after the words set down in Luke 5 about Peter, James and John, "Leaving everything, they followed him", this sacred Scripture supposed that he [Peter] had both nets and a house as his, and after Peter's words, "See, we have left everything", it supposes that he had also a sword and clothes as his. It remains, therefore, that from the words, "Leaving everything, they followed him" it cannot be inferred that the Apostles renounced the lordship of all temporal things. Again, in Luke 5[:27-9] we read of Matthew that when Jesus had said to him, "Follow me", he "got up, and, leaving everything, followed him"; and immediately the text says that Matthew, who was also called Levi, "made him a great banquet in his house". So it is clear that, however much Scripture says of him that "leaving everything, he followed him", it does not mean that he left those things in respect of lordship, since immediately it adds that in his house he made a great banquet for him. [12] And for this reason, when the Lord had said to someone who was not one of his disciples, "If you wish to be perfect, sell all you have and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven; and come, follow me" (Matthew 19[:21]), Peter said: "See, we have left everything" etc. [Matthew 19:27]. He did not say, "We have sold everything and given to the poor"; but he said, "We have left everything". For temporal things can be left in respect of care and affection for them, without renunciation of lordship. Or, "We have left everything", that is, except things without which this life cannot be lived, such as food or things necessary for food, which it is not likely they renounced: as the above-quoted Scriptures prove, and many others to be further discussed below in relation to the objections this heretic makes against the constitution Cum inter. [13] Concerning James and John, however, it is said in Mark 1 that "leaving their father Zebedee in the ship with the sailors, they followed him" [Jesus]. Certainly they did not leave their father so as to renounce him and afterwards not regard him as their father; indeed they remained his sons. Those words therefore do not prove that the words, "We have left everything" mean that they renounced all temporal things---those things at least of which sacred Scripture says the opposite---in respect of ownership and lordship. [14] Again, there is no objection from 12, q. 1, c. Dilectissimis, which this heretic quotes in his support [cf. 10.7-], in which blessed Clement, writing to his co-disciples living in Jerusalem with blessed James, Bishop of Jerusalem, equates the state of the Apostles and their disciples and the Jewish converts in Jerusalem after the sending of the Holy Spirit, in respect of the mode of having those temporal things, with the state of our first parents as they were created in the state of innocence. And he [Clement] says there, in respect of the state of our first parents: " Use of all things in the world should have been common to all men. But through iniquity one said that one thing was his and another that another thing was his, and thus among mortals division was made". Undoubtedly this text supposes that if our first parents had not sinned all things would have been common in respect of lordship or ownership; this is clear because he says that "through iniquity", that is through the sin of our first parents, "one said that one thing was his and another that another thing was his, and thus division was made among mortals". Now this division was made of that of which there had previously been community. But it was things that were divided, not simple use of fact. This is clear, because "one said that one thing was his and another that another thing was his": he does not say that one said that the use of one thing was his, and another the use of another, but one said that one thing was his, and another that another was his. And thus it is clear that it was things in respect of lordships that were divided, not use; and consequently it follows that before the division there was community in respect of the lordships of things. And this is shown more clearly in the continuation of the same chapter, as follows: "And just as the air or sunlight cannot be divided, so the other things which were given commonly to all men to have should not be divided either". Here he clearly says that all temporal things had been given commonly to all men to have; he does not say, "in respect of use of fact", but "to have", because use of fact cannot be had, as was proved above [3.29-]; if, therefore, they have been given to them, and by one who could give them (namely God), it must be said that they have been made lords, because to give something is to make it the receiver's. [15] Then blessed Clement adds, "For, keeping the manner of this custom, the Apostles and their disciples lived a common life, together with us and with you. For as you well know, the multitude of them", i.e. of believers, "were of one heart and one soul, and none of them, or of us, said of any of the things that he possessed that it was his, but all things were common to us and to them". In these words blessed Clement plainly supposes that before the conversion of those Jews mentioned in Acts 2[:41] and 4[:4] the Apostles and their disciples possessed some things---where he says, "The Apostles and their disciples lived a common life, together with us and with you" (speaking of the Jewish converts). And he explains what the common life consisted in: "For the multitude" of believers "were of one heart and one soul; and none of them"---namely, of the Apostles and their disciples, about whom he spoke before---"or of us"---namely, of the Jewish converts---"say of any of the things that he possessed"---notice that he plainly says that the Apostles and disciples possessed some things before---"that it was his, but all things were common to us"---that is, to the converts---"and to them"---that is, the Apostles and their disciples. And thus by this chapter it is quite clear that before the conversion of the Jews the Apostles and their disciples had some things and that they shared them with the Jewish converts, and the Jewish converts likewise shared the things they had with the Apostles and their disciples, in such a way that each of them---namely, of the Apostles and disciples and the Jewish converts---said of nothing that he possessed that it was his, but among them all things were common. [16] Also, his statement that after the words, "See, we have left everything", etc., the Apostles used things consumable by use, we say is false, for in things consumable by use, use in the proper sense cannot be had, nor can anyone use them, as was shown above [17] Again, in stating that blessed Augustine said that the Apostles "vowed to renounce all things", he says something false. For blessed Augustine did not say this; but when he related that the Apostles had said, "See, we have left everything, and followed you", he added, "This vow they had vowed most strongly". Tell me, what is the vow that they vowed? Certainly, it cannot be said that the vow was to renounce the lordship or ownership of all temporal things, since he did not mention this in what went before or in what follows. What, then, is the vow? Certainly, it seems that they had vowed that they would follow the Lord, and this was just mentioned at "We have followed you". And if it be said that indeed they had vowed that they would leave everything and follow the Lord, since words to this effect had preceded those words (since he had said, "See, we have left everything, and have followed you"), we say that it is not likely that blessed Augustine meant that such a vow, namely that "we have left everything", should be understood to have included the things that sacred Scripture afterwards asserts they had (such as the things it is proved above [11.1-29; 13.1-6] that they had). Again, it must not be thought that blessed Augustine thought that the Apostles themselves vowed not to have anything in common, since (intending to establish his own order in approximation to the apostolic life) he says to his Brothers in his Rule: "Be of one mind and one heart in the Lord, and do not call anything your own; but let everything be common among you, and let it be distributed to each of you as each has need. For thus you read in the Acts of the Apostles, 'For to them all things were common, and they were distributed to each as each had need'". Since, therefore, blessed Augustine and his Brothers had (and have) things in common, it is should not be made doubtful that blessed Augustine supposed that the Apostles had things in common. Therefore from this text of Augustine this heretic [Michael of Cesena] can by no means conclude that the Apostles renounced by vow the lordship of all things, or that they renounced it in proper and in common. [18] Again, the chapter 16, q. 1, Ex auctoritate, quoted by him above, is no objection; indeed, rather it tells against him. For it speaks of monks who, as is said there, follow the pattern of the Apostles; but it is certain that monks have movables and immovables in common in respect of ownership and lordship, as is proved by 18, q. 2, c. In nullo; therefore it seems that the Apostles also had, or were able to have, such things in common. However, it is true that in Judea they did not keep immovables, but rather sold them, because they foresaw that the Church would pass over to the gentiles, as is proved by Acts, 2 and 4, and by 12, q. 1, c. Futuram. [19] Further, this enemy of truth and faith argues as follows to prove that in things consumable by use, use can be had separate from lordship: [19.2] "All the tithes of the earth, whether of produce or of the fruit of trees, are the Lord's", as we read in the last chapter of Leviticus [27:30]. But only the use of tithes belongs to the levites, as in Numbers 18[:21]. Now it is certain that those tithes are of produce and fruit, which are things consumable by use; therefore, since the lordship of tithes is the Lord's and the use of them the levites', it follows that in things consumable by use, use can be had separate from lordship. [20] To this it must be said that he evidently argues from false premises. For his statement that the levites had only the use of tithes is false, as is proved from Numbers 18[:21], quoted by him in the opposite sense, where the Lord speaks thus: "To the sons of Levi I have given all the tithes of Israel as a possession, for the ministry by which they serve me in the tabernacle of the Covenant". From these words it is clear that the levites had in the tithes not only use, but also lordship. [20.6] It is no objection that in the same chapter it is said that the Lord set aside the tithes "for the use and necessities" of the levites: [20.8] for there is difference between giving a thing to someone for use and giving someone the use of a thing. For when the use of some usable thing is granted to someone, only the use of the thing is understood to have been given to him and not lordship, but when a thing is given to someone for use, not only the use of the thing but also lordship is understood to have been given. So when it is said in the chapter quoted before that the Lord set aside the tithes for "the use and necessities" of the levites, the Lord made clear for what purpose, or for what reason, he gave the tithes [and not merely their use] to the levites. [20.13] For we enjoy produce and fruit in two ways: in one way by eating them, to which purpose they were granted first and principally, according to the text of Genesis 1[:29], "See, I have given to you every grass, and all the trees that have in themselves the seed of their kind, to be your food". However, since sometimes someone who has plenty of such things is lacking in other things necessary to human life, the Lord meant that the levites could not only eat of that produce, but also by selling or exchanging it provide for themselves the other necessities of life; and therefore he said "for the use and necessities". And the same must be said of the words in the same chapter spoken to Aaron, when the Lord said, "All the first-fruits which the earth yields and are brought to the Lord they will grant for your use" [Numbers 18:13]. The Lord granted them the lordship of those things, as is plain in the same chapter, in which the Lord speaking to Aaron said, "Every offering and sacrifice, and whatever is given to me for sin and crime, and becomes holy of holies, will be yours and your children's . . . But the first-fruits that the children of Israel vow and offer I have given to you and your sons and daughters by perpetual right" [Numbers 18:9]. From these texts it is clear that in tithes and the other things mentioned above Aaron and the levites had not only use, but lordship. [21] Again, he tries to show that to say that in things consumable by use simple use of fact cannot be had separate from lordship is to attack the life of Christ and his Apostles. For the perfection of poverty, as also other perfections of the gospel counsels, existed in Christ and the Apostles most perfectly; and it is certain, according to him, that gospel poverty excludes the solicitude that ownership or lordship of temporal things requires. From this it follows, according to him, that in things consumable by use, use can be separated from ownership and lordship of them. [22] To this it must be said that we concede that the perfection of poverty existed in Christ and the Apostles most perfectly. The perfection, indeed, of gospel poverty consists more in the mind, namely that the mind does not stick by love to these temporal things, than in a lack of temporal things. This poverty Christ had most perfectly, and after him his Apostles, and consequently they had the perfection of gospel poverty. [23] But to his statement that "gospel poverty excludes lordship and ownership of things consumed by use", we say that it is false; indeed Scripture supposes that the Apostles had ownership and lordship of those things, at least in common, as Acts 4 proves, as was shown above [4.1-]. [24] To his statement that the renunciation of ownership and lordship excludes solicitude, we say similarly that it is false. That such renunciation does not exclude solicitude is clear. For it is certain that if a lord grants a slave a peculium, although ownership and lordship of the peculium does not fall to the slave, the slave is not therefore free of solicitude; otherwise it would have been unjust for the Lord to blame the negligent slave spoken of in Luke 19[:23] because he had not put out to use the money given him by his master. And we see plainly that a person to whom the utility of a thing pertains without lordship is more solicitous about the thing than its bare lord, as can be seen plainly in the Friars Minor; they assert that they have in such things bare use of fact but are more solicitous about them than the Roman Church, to which they assert that lordship of those things pertains. [25] Further, that heretic says that this teaching conflicts with the life of the Apostles, for, according to him (citing blessed Remigius), in respect of the renunciation of ownership of temporal things the Apostles were called back to the dignity of the first man. But the first man (and his posterity, if they had stood fast in original justice) would have had use of things consumable by use without ownership and lordship of them, according to blessed Clement (so he says). [25.6] To prove this he brings forward 12, q. 1, c. Dilectissimis. Therefore, to say that in things consumable by use, use cannot be separated from ownership and lordship is, he says, to attack the life of the Apostles and of religious who imitate the Apostles in renouncing ownership of all things. [26] To this it must be said that his statement that in the state of innocence our first parents did not have lordship of anything but only simple use of fact (at least after the blessing, "Increase," etc.) expressly contradicts sacred Scripture. For we read in Genesis 1[:28] that the Lord said to our first parents, "Increase and multiply, and fill the earth and subject it." (In place of "subject it" another reading has "and dominate it" [i.e. be lords over it]; Augustine follows this reading in his Literal Commentary on Genesis, and in his City of God, book XIV, Chapter xxi.) The passage continues, "And dominate the fish of the sea and the birds of the air, and all living things that move upon the earth." From this it appears evidently that after the blessing our first parents had lordship [dominium] in the state of innocence over the earth, the fish of the sea, the birds of the air, and all living things that move upon the earth. [27] And if it be asked whether that lordship was exclusive or common, it seems it must be said that, if at the time of the blessing spoken of above only Adam had been formed and not Eve (as the order of sacred Scripture indicates evidently, since that blessing was given to Adam when he was outside Paradise, but Eve was formed when Adam was put into the garden, as is clear in Genesis, Chapters 1 and 2)---it seems that before Eve was formed the lordship of temporal things was exclusive to Adam, not common. Indeed it could not have been common, since at that time he was alone, and in respect of one who has never had any fellows nothing can be called common. This seems to be said explicitly in Ecclesiasticus 17[:1], where it is said: "God created man from the earth and made him according to his own likeness . . . He gave him power over things upon the earth and put fear of him upon all flesh, and he dominated the beasts and birds." From this it is clear that he dominated by himself. And from this it follows that for that time he had lordship by himself, because according to Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, Chapter 12, "From 'lordship' [dominium] is derived 'lord' [dominus], 'dominating,' and 'dominator.'" Accordingly, since it is said of Adam by himself that he dominated the beasts and birds, it follows that he was lord by himself. And that Eve had not then been formed is clear, because immediately after these words, "And he dominated the beasts and birds," it continues, "He created from him a helper like himself." Damascene, in Book II, last chapter, also seems to be of this opinion, where, speaking of our first parent, he says: "The creator made this human being as a male, appointed and gave to him his own divine grace, and through this put him in communion with himself. Accordingly he made him dominator,44 prophetic namer of the animals, as of his own gifts"---another reading has: "as of his own slaves." It continues: "He made from him his own helper," etc. [28] There is no objection from c. Dilectissimis, which was quoted on the other side [25.6]. For that does not prove that our first parents did not have lordship of temporal things, but that they did not have it dividedly. Indeed, from the text of the philosopher that blessed Clement quotes in that chapter it is inferred evidently that they had lordship in common. For he says that "just as the air or sunlight cannot be divided, so the other things given to be possessed in common should not be divided either." From these words it appears clearly that the philosopher said that those temporal things were given to all to be possessed in common. And if they were given by him who could give them, since he was God, and to him who was capable of having them, namely man, it follows that a lordship of them was made. The philosopher introduces the comparison of air and sunlight with temporal things not in respect of lordship---as if, just as they did not have lordship of air and sunlight, so they should not have lordship of temporal things---but only in respect of their not being divided. For he says this: "And just as air and sunlight cannot be divided, so the other things given to be possessed in common should not be divided either, but should be possessed as common things." But of air blessed Augustine says this in Book II of On Free Will: "You can breathe in some of the air that I breathe out, but you cannot breathe in the part that has gone to nourish me, because I cannot return it. (For doctors say we take nourishment through the nostrils.) When I breathe only I can feel this nourishment, and I cannot return it by breathing out for you to breathe it in and feel it with your nostrils." [29] Further, to show that use of fact can be separated from lordship of things consumable by use , he quotes Luke 19[:22-3], where a lord said to a slave who had kept idle money he had given him for trading: "Wicked slave, why did you not give my money, so that when I came I might have demanded it back with usury?" From this text it is clear, he says, that the slave actually had use of the money, while the lord had ownership of it. Therefore, since the law alleged above testifies expressly that money is one of the things consumed by use, according to him the above teaching [that in things consumable by use simple use of fact cannot be separated from lordship] contradicts the holy Gospel. [30] To this it must be said, as was proved above [6.17-], that in things consumable by use it is impossible for anyone to have use or simple use of fact. And the above-quoted Scripture is no objection. [30.3] For the use of money---or rather, its "using up" [abusus]45---is not simply to hand it over to someone, but to hand it over in such a way that it is regarded as having been consumed in respect of lordship. [30.5] Thus even if a slave were actually to hand the money over to the borrower, the money can not be said to have been used (or rather used up) by the handing over alone, without transfer of lordship, but the money is regarded as having been consumed by a transfer of lordship; and indeed not the slave, but the lord in whose name the loan was made, makes this transfer. Thus, since the slave had lent in the lord's name, the lord himself seems [30.10] to have used (rather, used up) the money, and not the slave. Moreover, a slave who lends money on a lord's instruction should not be said to have a simple use (or using up) of fact, since through a grant he had a right to make such loans. [31] Again, he says that this assertion goes against and conflicts with a decision of the holy Roman Church, because in the decretal which begins "Exiit qui seminat", approved, he says, by the whole Church and confirmed in the Council of Vienne, it is defined that the Friars Minor have use of fact of all the things they use, without any lordship and ownership. Of this use it says: "This use, having the name not 'of right' but only 'of fact', offers users only what is of fact in using and nothing of right". But it is manifest, he says, that the Friars Minor have use of fact of things consumable by use; therefore in things consumable by use, use of fact can be separated from ownership and lordship. [32] To this it must be said, as the constitution Ad conditorem canonum says, that the maker of this canon Exiit meant the above words to refer to things not consumed by use. This is proved clearly enough from what goes before and after. For before that he had put the following: "Since in temporal things there is to consider especially ownership, possession, usufruct, the right to use, and simple use of fact", etc. And afterwards there follows: "It was fitting for that profession, which willingly vowed to follow Christ the poor man in so great a poverty, . . . to be . . . content with necessary use" of fact. Now since the things listed above---namely, possession, usufruct, right to use, and use of fact taken in the proper sense---cannot be found in things consumable by use, but only ownership, as is clear from the definitions of usufruct and use, it is apparent that the maker of that canon did not mean those words to refer to things consumable by use, in which the these things cannot be found. This is also apparent from the words which follow afterwards in the same constitution. For it continues that there is no conflict between the above---namely that the Brothers are content with use of fact---and "what civil providence has decided in human affairs, namely that use and usufruct cannot be separated forever from lordship, lest lordship, with usufruct cut off from it, be rendered forever useless to lords". This law is meant indeed of things the use of which can remain with one person and the lordship (though useless) with another. This cannot happen in things consumable by use, since in them the substance of the thing ceases to exist through the usuary's46 use or "using up", and consequently not even useless ownership remains, as is said in the constitution Ad conditorem canonum. If this heretic means that the constitution Exiit defined that the Friars Minor have simple use of fact in things consumable by use, we say that it defined the impossible, and consequently by law the definition would not hold. For since it is impossible in things consumable by use to have use of right or of fact separate from lordship, because this conflicts with reason and with law, a statute to the opposite effect, no matter who made it, would not hold. Again, when he says that this constitution was "approved by the whole Church", we say that on this point, namely that the Friars Minor have use of fact in things consumable by use, it was never approved by the whole Church. We say also that it was not "confirmed in the Council of Vienne", and that it was confirmed will not be able to appear in any constitution, or elsewhere, not indeed one promulgated by the advice of the brethren [i.e., of the Cardinals]. [33] Further, this heretic says that the constitution Ad conditorem canonum contains another error, since it contains the following: "Further, neither can a simple use of fact that is neither a servitude nor something for which a right of using is available, be established or had in such things", i. e. things consumable by use. "For since, properly speaking, to use a thing is precisely to receive, in full or in part, its fruits or some other advantage that can come from it saving the substance of the thing, it follows that no one can use a thing from which no advantage can come to him saving its substance---such as things consumable by use certainly are. From these points it is clear that neither the use that is a personal servitude,49 nor the right of using that is not a servitude but a pure personal right, nor the act of using itself without any right, can be established or had in things consumable by use, since each of these requires that it should be possible for the person with the right of using, or the user, to derive some advantage from the thing saving the substance of the thing: which certainly cannot be found in things consumable by use . . . But although, in things consumable by use, neither a right of using nor using itself can be established or had, it is nevertheless possible for someone to 'use them up' [abuti]. When we are talking about things consumable by use, 'using up' [abuti] is taken for the consumption of the thing, which is the opposite of use. To use [uti] indeed presupposes that with the use the substance of the thing remains 'saved'; but using up [abuti] requires that with such an act the substance of the thing be consumed, since 'to use up' [abuti] in this context can properly be said to be nothing else but to use against the nature of use." [34] These are the words of the constitution, from which this heretic says it is clear that, because it teaches dogmatically "that neither use of fact nor the act of using can be had in things consumable by use and that no one can use such things consumable by use---although one can use them up by abusus, which is against the nature of use", this constitution manifestly conflicts with sacred Scripture. [34.6] To prove this he cites Leviticus 27[:30], where it is said that "all the tithes of the earth, whether of produce or of the fruit of trees, are the Lord's", and Numbers 18[:23-4] [where] it is said of the levites that "they will possess nothing else, being content with the offerings of tithes, which I have separated for their uses and necessities". From these words, he says, it is clear "that use in things consumable by use is had by a statute of God". [35] To this it must be said that he manifestly bases this objection on falsehoods. For it is false that the levites had in the tithes only simple use of fact, and it explicitly contradicts that Chapter 18 of Numbers which he cites himself, where the Lord says: "To the sons of Levi I have given all the tithes of Israel as a possession, for the ministry by which they serve me in the tabernacle of the Covenant" [Numbers 18:21]. It is clear from this that the levites did not have only use in the tithes, but also had lordship. And it is no objection that it is said in the same chapter that the lord separated the tithes for the levites' "uses and necessities" [Numbers 18:24]. [35.8] For there is a difference between giving someone use of fact in something and giving someone something for his uses and necessities, as was shown above [20.7-]. To his statement that use in things consumable by use is had by a statute of God we say that it is false, because in the whole of sacred Scripture there is no mention of simple use of fact. [36] Again, that heretic says that "wherever sacred Scripture speaks of the use of things consumable by use, it always shows that one can use things consumable by use, and that properly and truly it is possible to use them, as is clear in 1 Timothy 5[:23], 'Use a little wine'; in 2 Kings 13[:18], 'The virgin daughters of the king used clothes of this kind'; in Numbers 18[:13], 'All first-fruits . . . that are brought to the Lord they will grant for your uses', and a little later, 'The flesh they grant to your use'; in Judges 19[:19], 'Having bread and wine for the uses of yourself and of your maidservant'; in Deuteronomy 24[:19] at the end; in Joshua 5[:12], 'Neither have they used besides'; in Leviticus 7[:24], 'For various uses' etc.; in Esther 2[:3] and Exodus 28[:42-3]. Again, it is also clear", according to him "from texts of the saints, namely of St Clement 12, q. 1, c. Dilectissimis, and of St Augustine, dist. 41". [37] To this it must be said that the constitution Ad conditorem canonum speaks of [the noun] "use" and of [the verb] "to use" according as use is divided against lordship and ownership, and against usufruct and the right of using, in accordance with the decretal Exiit, which says that those things---namely ownership, usufruct the right of using and simple use of fact---are found in temporal things. [37.5] It was because of this [i.e. Exiit] that the constitution Ad conditorem canonum was made. [38] To show that money counts among things consumable by use this heretic cites the law, as is clear from the foregoing. [39] It is certain, however, that, according to the laws, in things consumable by use neither usufruct, nor the right of using that is a servitude, nor also the right of using that is not a servitude but a pure personal right, can be established or had. This is proved by Digest, de usufructu earum, quae usu consumuntur, l. 1 and l. 2; Digest, de iureiurando, 1. Sed et si possessori, para. Sed si rerum; Digest, Commodati, l. 3, last para.; and many similar laws. [40] Also, no one can use such things, taking "use" properly. For "use", or "to use", if taken properly, according to the laws, requires that from the thing in which one asserts that one has use, or that one wishes to use, one be able to obtain fruit or some other advantage, saving the substance of the thing. This cannot be found in things consumable by use. And by this blessed John Chrysostom explains why the lender of money cannot licitly take money as a price while the lessor of a field or a house can licitly do so, as has been said above [3.14-]. From this it is clear that use cannot be had in things consumable by use, and also no one can use them, since this conflicts with law and with reason. [41] However, although in such things (namely, things consumable by use) "use" and "to use" do not properly claim a place for themselves, consumption and the act of consuming do take place, as the constitution says. However, they cannot be said to be simple nor to be separated from lordship of the thing consumed, since with the consumption of the thing lordship of it perishes and altogether ceases to be, as the constitution Ad conditorem canonum proves. It says: "Further, if in things consumable by use, use could be established or had, such a use could not be said to be simple, nor separated from the substance, ownership, or lordship of the thing, since by such use (that is, by the act of using) and in the very act, and with that very act, such a thing is consumed; and without the consumption of the thing such use could not exist". From this it is clear that such use cannot be said to be simple or separate from lordship, and this is clear, since through such use of fact the ownership and lordship of the thing are known to perish. [42] We say, therefore, that the decretal Ad conditorem canonum speaks of "use" and "to use" in the same way as the decretal Exiit did. It speaks of them in the same way as the laws do, according to which it is impossible (speaking of them properly, as the decretal Ad conditorem speaks, and says expressly in the paragraph Rursus, nec simplex usus facti, where it says, "For since to use a thing is, properly, nothing other than . . . " etc.) that they should take place in things consumable by use, as is proved by Digest, De usufructu earum rerum, quae usu consumuntur, l. Hoc Senatus, para. 1, and final paragraph, and Digest, De iureiurando, l. Sed et si possessori, para. Sed si rerum. [43] But although, as has been said above, use in the proper sense has no place in things consumable by use, it is nevertheless often said that someone has a use in them, or uses them. But whenever this happens, "use" or "to use" should be taken for the consumption of a thing. Thus we say that whenever sacred Scripture attributes use in such things consumable by use, it takes it for the consumption of the thing, as is clear in the text, "Use a little wine" [1 Timothy 5:23]. For there "use" is taken for "consume", that is for "drink". For it is certain that wine is consumed by drinking. And from this the answer is clear to other texts adduced, except that the text of Numbers 18[:13], "All the first-fruits that are brought to the Lord they will grant for your use", is adduced in a false way, as has been shown above [44] Again, this heretic says that "to say that there are some things consumable by use, and yet that they cannot be used, implies a manifest contradiction". [45] Indeed, by this he blamed as inexperienced and ignorant the legislator who framed the rubric, de usufructu earum quae usu consumuntur ["Concerning usufruct of things that are consumed by use", Digest, 7.5.1.2]. Thus the constitution speaks as the legislator and the laws mostly speak, taking "use" for "using up" [abuti], that is for the consumption of a thing, because no other use, i. e. besides consumption, can exist in things consumable by use. And therefore the law, Digest, De iureiurando, l. Sed et si possessori, para. Sed si rerum, speaks thus: "If of things in which usufruct cannot be established on account of using up [abusus]", that is, on account of the consumption of the thing, etc.; and the gloss on the rubric, Digest, "Concerning usufruct of things that are consumed by use", on the word "use", says, "that is, as if [quasi] by use"; there it explicitly indicates that "use" is put there improperly. [46] Further, this heretic says that, since according to Augustine, in Book I of De doctrina Christiana, "abusus" is illicit use, from the foregoing "it seems to follow that whenever Christ, the Apostles and other holy men did acts of eating, drinking and wearing, they abused things of this sort; and to think or say this is impious and blasphemous". [47] To this we say that when Christ, the Apostles and other holy men, they ate bread and drank wine, they used up [abusi sunt] those things, as abusus is taken in the constitution mentioned above, in which it is taken for the consumption of a thing, as is manifestly clear from its text. [48] But against this, this heretic says that to say "that abuti is taken for the consumption of a thing, has no force: first, because it is proved neither by reason nor by authority that it should be taken thus; also because to 'abuse' [abuti] a thing is taken always univocally52 in a bad meaning, as is clear in Genesis 34[:31], in the last chapter of Esther [16:2], in 1 Corinthians 9:18, and in many other places". [49] To this we say that his statement that it is proved neither by reason nor by authority that abusus is taken for the consumption of a thing is evidently false. For in the law, Digest, De usufructu earum rerum, quae usu consumuntur, l. Hoc Senatus, para. Si pecuniae, we read: "If the usufruct bequeathed is of money, or of things which consist in abusus, and no caution intervenes, it is to be seen, when the usufruct is finished, whether the money that was given, or other things that consist in consumption, can be stipulated". Here it is clear that in things that are consumed by use the legislator uses interchangeably the words abusus and "consumption". And in the same law, the last paragraph, we read: "The money which we have said to be for usufruct, or the other things which are for abusus, these same things should also be said to be for use". Again, in Digest, De iureiurando, l. Sed et si possessori, para. Sed si rerum, we read: "But if of things in which usufruct cannot be established on account of abusus", that is, on account of the consumption of the thing. Here the legislator clearly takes abusus for consumption. From these it is clear that the legislators, speaking properly of things that are consumed by use, deny that use takes place in these and grant that abusus does take place. This abusus, i. e. consumption of the thing, if it is done by someone to whom a right of "abusing", i. e. consuming, belongs, will be licit; if it is done by someone to whom the right does not belong, it must be regarded as illicit. [50] Also, that abusus is put for consumption stands to reason. For a preposition usually intensifies or diminishes the sense of the word to which it is prefixed. Accordingly, it is clear that it stands to reason that by the preposition ab the sense of the word usus, to which it is prefixed, is intensified. [51] Moreover, he says something false, since he says that abusus, whenever it is predicated really, not verbally, "is taken in a bad meaning". For in the laws of the emperors abusus, when things consumed by use are under discussion, is commonly taken in a good sense, as has been proved above [49.1-17]. [52] Further, we find that in sacred Scripture abusus is taken in a good sense. Thus in Jeremias 18[:23] the prophet, speaking to God, says, "Let them be ruined in your sight, in the time of your rage abuse them", where abutere should be taken not for an illicit act but for a licit act, since in God abusus taken in a bad sense does not happen. "Abuse them" means the same as "consume them". And thus it is clear that abusus is taken in sacred Scripture, also, for consumption, and in a good sense. [53] Further, this heretic says that the definition that the constitution gives of "to use" is not the true definition and is not in harmony with the definitions that the saints give. [54] To this we say that the definition, description or explanation that the constitution gives of [the verb] "to use" is suitable and true. For it says "that to use some thing is, properly, nothing but to take in whole or in part the fruit of the thing, or other advantage that can arise from it, saving the substance of the thing". That this is suitable is clear. For [the noun] "use" is defined thus: "Use is the right of using others' things saving the substance of the thing". From this it follows that "to use", speaking properly, requires that with the use the substance of the thing remain "saved", and that from it some advantage can arise for the user. [55] To his statement that this definition is not in harmony with the definitions the saints give, we say that it is not unsuitable that different definitions should be given of the same thing considered in different ways. And the saints who define "to use" take "to use" otherwise than this constitution takes it. For they take "to use" in respect of an end, namely the end to which the things they use are directed; and in this sense Augustine says that "to use" is to refer things that come into use to the things that should be enjoyed. [55.7] But the decretal Exiit, on the occasion of which the constitution Ad conditorem canonum was made, speaks of use not as a thing is directable to an end, but as use is distinguished from lordship, ownership, usufruct and right of using. And it is therefore no wonder if the saints have given other definitions of use, since they took "to use" in another way than the constitution does. [56] Further, this heretic, in speaking of "use" and "to use", puts himself outside the way of speaking of sacred Scripture and of the saints. For he says that in things consumable by use simple use of fact takes place without any right. Truly, that way of speaking [i.e. the phrase "simple use of fact"] cannot be found, we believe, either in the New Testament, or in the Old, or in any writings of the saints. Furthermore, let that heretic notice whether Augustine's definition agrees with his own statements. He says that in things consumable by use simple use of fact can be had separate from lordship. But Augustine says that "to use" is to refer things that come into use to the things that should be enjoyed. Undoubtedly this definition does not agree with his statements, since he speaks of simple use of fact and that definition speaks of things, saying that "to use" is to refer the things that come into use etc. [57] Again, this heretic says that the above assertion "conflicts with a decision of the holy Roman church in the decretal Exiit, which says: 'In things relating to food, clothing, divine worship, and edifying study, the necessary use of things is granted to the Brothers'. From these words we gather evidently that it is possible to use things relating to food and clothing", which it is certain are things consumable by use. [58] We say that by those words he did not grant the Brothers simple use of fact; indeed by the very grant of use to them, if the grant was valid, he granted them a right of using, and thus they do not have in them simple use of fact. And if it is said that indeed he granted them no right, we say that in respect of things consumable by use he put "use" improperly, for consumption of a thing. And it is nothing new that the same word should be put properly and improperly in respect of different things. Further, the decretal [Exiit] says, "necessary use of things, in matters that relate to food and clothing, has been granted to the Brothers"; it does not say "use of fact", and thus does not support him [the appellant]. And if it is said at all that the author of the canon meant use of fact, taking "use" properly, we say that since in such things use cannot be established or had, as the constitution [Ad conditorem] proves and as has been proved above [3.1-] in the first section, the constitution [Exiit] would contain, in this respect, something impossible, and consequently, since a constitution should be possible, it would not be valid. However that was not the author's intention, as the constitution Ad conditorem canonum proves. [59] Again, this heretic says that the constitution Ad conditorem canonum contains another error, in that it contains the following: "Further", it says, "if anyone could have simple use of fact without right of using, it is certain that such an act of using would have to be regarded as being not a just act, since that use would be one for which there was no right of using. But such a use, namely one that is not just, does not pertain to a state of perfection, and does not add anything to perfection, but is manifestly known rather to conflict with and detract from it". And below, speaking of the use of fact granted to the Friars Minor as it is contained in the decretal Exiit, it says: "From this it follows that use of fact, of which the ordinance speaks, should be understood of such as is just, that is, for which there is a right of using". [60] Wishing to impose on the constitution what it does not say, this heretic says that the constitution meant to speak of a "civil and worldly right of using, which is an exclusive [proprium] right, for which there is given action in court. This is clear", so he says, "in the constitution Ad conditorem and in the constitution that begins 'Quia quorundam'" in which this, he says, "is plainly manifest". He asserts he will speak of this later on. But he asserts that these things conflict with sacred Scripture, when Peter says (Matthew 19[:27]) in the person of the Apostles, "See, we have left everything" etc., "from which", so he says, "it is clear from catholic teachers that they left the right of action in court, because it is not consistent with such perfection of supererogation, since it entangles people in sin, as the Apostle proves (1 Corinthians 6[:7]) where he says, 'Already, indeed, there is plainly a fault in you, that you have lawsuits with one another'. And therefore", so he says, "Christ enjoined upon the perfect not to litigate or contend in court, in Matthew 5[:40] and Luke 6[:29]". [61] To this we say that the constitution speaks clearly and explicitly of the use for which there is a right of using, which differs from a right of action [i.e. right to sue]; for a right of using can belong to one to whom a right of action does not. We say therefore that he imposes on the constitution something it did not mean and does not say. Whether such a right is worldly and civil, and whether a right of action for it belonged to the Apostles, will be stated below [108.1-] in connection with the things this heretic opposes to the constitution Cum inter. [62] Again, when he says that the constitution Quia quorundam contains manifestly that civil and worldly right is understood to be proper [i.e. exclusive], he plainly lies; indeed the constitution says clearly that the community of Brothers has a right of using. For when Innocent and Alexander in their explanations of the rule of the Friars Minor said that the Order has use of the places, houses, equipment and books that it is permissible for the Order to have, the constitution Quia quorundam, meaning to prove that this should be understood of use of right, adds: "For when it is said in the above explanations that the Order has use of the above things, this must be referred to use of right. Facts, indeed, which are of singulars, demand and require a true person. But an order is not a true person, but should rather be regarded as represented and imaginary. Therefore what is 'of fact' cannot truly befit it, although what is of right can befit it". From these words it is clear that the constitution Quia quorundam does not say that the right of using is proper, but common to the whole community. [63] Again, that heretic says that if use could be separated from the right of using, use separated from a right of using would not be unjust, "because to have a right of using is one thing, to have permission to use is another. And therefore, although use without any right and permission to use would be illicit, nevertheless use without a right of using but with permission to use" should not be regarded as illicit. [64] According to this, this heretic seems to make a difference between a right and a permission, and supposes that one may have permission to use from someone who can grant it and not have a right of using; but this is evidently false. For if someone grants another permission to use his usable thing in such a way that the permission is valid, it is certain that the person to whom the permission was granted has the right of using the thing. This is why, although a religious elected in concord outside his monastery [e.g. elected to be abbot of another monastery] has no right to consent without the permission of his superior, when permission is obtained he has the right to [65] Besides, this heretic will say that he to whom a permission to use some thing is granted uses the thing justly or unjustly, or he uses the thing neither justly nor unjustly. If he says unjustly, that is certainly in harmony with the constitution spoken of above, which says that anyone who uses without right uses unjustly. If he says that he uses it justly, it follows consequently that he uses it also by right; because what is done justly is done also by right; [see] Extra, De verborum significatione, c. Ius dictum; 14, q. 4, c. Quid dicam. [65.7] But if he says that he to whom the permission to use is granted uses neither justly nor unjustly, this is false. For it is impossible for an individual human act to be indifferent---that is, neither good nor bad, just nor unjust. For since that act is called human which proceeds from deliberate will, and consequently is done for some purpose (which is of course the will's object), if the purpose of the act is good the act must be good also, but if the purpose is bad the act must be bad; for as Augustine says in his book De moribus ecclesiae, according as the purpose is praiseworthy or culpable, so our works are praiseworthy or culpable. [66] Neither is it an objection if it be said that Isidore seems to put an intermediate between the just and the unjust, namely fas, when he says that "to go through another's field is fas, but not right [ius]". For Isidore had divided law into divine and human, and had given names to these laws, saying that "fas is divine law, right [ius] is human law". Wishing therefore to give an example of these, he added: "To go through another's field is fas"---that is, is permissible by divine law---"but not right [ius]"---that is, is not permitted by human law, as is clear from dist. 1, c. Omnes leges. Isidore therefore did not wish to put fas as an intermediate between the just and the unjust, but to show that something is permissible by divine law that is not permissible by human law. [67] Again, this heretic tries to attack the constitution in this, that intending to prove that in a thing consumable by use simple use (that is, without a right of using) can not be had separate from ownership or lordship, it says: "Further, that in a thing consumable by use simple use (that is, without a right of using) can not be had separate from ownership or lordship is proved as follows. If such use could be had, it would be had either before the act itself, or in the act, or after the act is completed. But that this cannot happen is clear from the fact that what does not exist cannot be had. [67.8] Now it is clear that before it is done, while it is being done and after it is completed, the act itself does not exist in reality, from which it follows that it cannot be had. For although before the act itself someone has power to do it, still the act itself does not through this exist in reality, except in potency. And while the act is being done, it is still not in reality, since 'is' signifies a completed thing, a description which does not fit an act while it is being done. For what has happened of an act being done, already is not, and what is being done is instantaneous or momentary, perceivable more by intellect than by sense. Again, after the act has been completed, although if some thing has been produced from the act done, this thing can be had, the act done, which has now passed, is not itself had". [68] These are the words of the constitution, from which this heretic tries to conclude that the above proof "destroys the deeds of Christ and his Apostles, which sacred Scripture testifies that they did": namely, because if the act of using cannot be had, because it does not exist in reality either before it is done or while it is being done or after it has been completed, it consequently follows that nothing can be done, since the thing done does not exist in reality before it is done or while it is being done, except for an instant, nor after it has been completed. [69] Undoubtedly that consequence is false. Rather, the complete opposite should be inferred, namely that if an act of using, since it does not exist in reality, cannot be had, it should be inferred that since what has been done does not exist in reality, it can be done. For just as what does not exist cannot be had, so what has been done cannot [now] be done; so if an act of using cannot be had, since it does not exist in reality, it follows that what has been done, since it does not exist in reality, can be done. [70] Again, this heretic says that by the above argument it would follow that the use of things consumable by use cannot be had even conjoined with ownership or lordship. We confess that this is undoubtedly true of use of fact, and we say the same of things not consumable by use. For although one can use them de facto, one cannot "have" use of fact in such things, as is clear from the above. [71] Moreover, this heretic says that the constitution includes something false, since it says that "if in things consumable by use, use can be established or had, then use of this kind could not be said to be simple or separate from ownership and lordship, since by such use---that is, by the act of using---and in that act, and with that act, such a thing is consumed, and the act is done in respect of the substance of the thing itself; and such use cannot take place without the consumption of the thing itself". [72] For he says that the constitution means that such things are consumed immediately and finally in the act of using, whereas "it is manifest that clothes are not immediately in the first act of using consumed finally and altogether, just as bread also is not immediately consumed in the beginning of the act; and just as it is not unsuitable that a lord should have lordship of a slave who is eating, so it is not unsuitable that the lord should have lordship of the food or bread in the slave's mouth". [73] To this it must be said that this heretic imposes on the constitution what it neither meant nor said, namely that in the first act of using, things consumable by use are consumed finally and altogether. But it meant, and manifestly expressed, that by the complete [perfectum, "completed", perfect tense] act of using, by which things are said to be consumable by use, they are consumed [present tense]. For it said that "by such use---that is, by the act of using---and in that act, and with that act, such things are consumed". For it puts conjunctively "act of using, and in that act, and with that act"; thus it sufficiently expressed that such things are consumed not by the beginning of the act, but by the complete act. Also, it added that the act of using "is done in respect of the substance of the thing" consumable by use; "and such use cannot take place without the consumption of the thing itself". So since it says that such use cannot take place without the consumption of the thing, it expressed clearly enough that it referred to the use by which the thing is consumed, not to its beginning. [74] Again, this heretic tries to attack the constitution because it says that the retaining of lordship that the supreme pontiff has done in the things that had come, or will in future come, to the Friars Minor, "has not benefited the Brothers as far as the state of perfection is concerned by enabling them to say that they are poorer because they lack such lordship than they would be if they were to possess those things along with the lordship they say they lack. For such lack of a lordship that is devoid of every real present, and hoped-for future, advantage does not make anyone who does not have it the poorer . . . . Being for the future unwilling that under the pretext or veil of such verbal, bare and obscure lordship an encouragement be given to the great evils that proceed from such a pretence, we ordain", etc. [75] The above words, according to that heretic, conflict with and contradict sacred Scripture and the teaching of the gospels and the Apostles and of holy mother Church. "For it has been shown above", he asserts, "from divine Scripture that the Apostles, and perfect men following them, on Christ's counsel left ownership and lordship of all temporal things and were content with the use of things necessary to the sustenance of human life, a use which it is not permissible to renounce. It is certain", according to him, "that the lordship of all the temporal things they used, the lordship the Apostles left on Christ's counsel, was devoid of all temporal advantage---that is, [advantage] by useful use. This is quite clear in the case of their nets. They left ownership and lordship of their nets (keeping the use, as the Gospel history testifies), since the renunciation of the ownership and lordship of those things---and not of their use, as is shown above ---is included in Christ's counsel on the renunciation of temporal things. If, therefore, the lack of such lordship does not pertain to perfection and does not make anyone who does not have it the poorer, as the constitution teaches dogmatically, it follows that Christ gave a pretended and deceitful teaching to those who wished to attain perfection when he counselled that they should leave all temporal things in respect of ownership and lordship, and that Augustine and Jerome, who were doctors of the Church, and other holy fathers, founders of religious orders, erred, who, wishing to follow this counsel of Christ, professed this renunciation of the ownership and lordship of all things". [76] Indeed, this heretic, like a violator of the law, notoriously quotes the constitution incompletely, leaving out words that plainly suggest his fault. For this constitution intends to prove that the retaining of lordship by the supreme pontiff did not benefit the Brothers in respect of the state of perfection, and this heretic leaves the proof out. It is as follows (as is more plainly evident from the text of the constitution): It is clear, it says, "that this retaining of lordship did not benefit them in respect of the state of perfection. The perfection of Christian life mainly and essentially consists in charity, which the Apostle calls 'the bond of perfection', which in some way unites or joins a man in this life with his end. Contempt of temporal goods and renunciation of ownership of them opens the way to this perfection especially because the solicitude that acquiring, preserving and managing temporal things requires, which commonly impedes the act of charity, is cut off. It follows that if the same solicitude persists after divestment of property as existed before it, such divestment can contribute nothing to such perfection. But it is certain that after the above ordinance [Exiit] the Brothers were no less solicitous in acquiring and preserving those goods, in court and otherwise, than they had been before it, and than other mendicant religious are who have some things in common." We believe, certainly, that this is a proof that no sensible person will reject, which is why this heretic did not quote it. [77] Also, the constitution meant to prove that the retention of lordship [by the Roman see] is of no advantage in enabling the Brothers to describe themselves because they lack such lordship as poorer than they would be if they held the things themselves together with the lordship they say they lack. It proves this as follows: "For although our predecessor thought that the lordship of things that should happen to be offered or granted, or come in some other way, to the Brothers---that is, things of which the Order, or the Brothers, are permitted to have use of fact---should be taken to himself or to the Roman Church, with simple use of fact reserved to the Brothers, and decreed that [the lordship thus] pertained freely [to himself and the Roman Church], as has been stated above: nevertheless, in view of the Brothers' manner of using, and its effect, and the subsequent sufferance72 of the Roman Church concerning that manner of using, it is not the Brothers' use but rather the lordship of the Roman Church that should be called 'simple'. For who could describe as a 'simple usuary' someone permitted to exchange, sell or give the usuary thing? Undoubtedly these acts conflict with the nature of a usuary and do not pertain to a usuary. But the Brothers themselves do these things with the movable things mentioned above. And that the lordship reserved to the Roman Church should be regarded as 'simple' appears from the fact that no temporal benefit has thus far come to the Church from it, neither is it hoped that such benefit should come in future, since it was not the intention either of the reserver or of the Brothers themselves that the profit of these things should come to anyone at all except the Brothers. This undoubtedly has been made more evidently clear by the manner [of using] of the Brothers themselves and the subsequent sufferance of the Roman Church. And that such was the intention of the legislator is clear also from the fact that he retained for himself and for the Roman Church the lordship of precisely those things of which the Order and the Brothers are permitted to have use of fact. But lack of such [simple] lordship, devoid of all benefit in reality in the present and in hope for the future, does not make anyone who does not have it the poorer in respect of temporal poverty, which these Brothers claim for themselves as having in higher degree than other mendicants who have things in common." From this passage we believe it is evidently proved that, in view of the Brothers' use of the things in which they assert they have simple use of fact and the sufferance of the Apostolic See, lack of such lordship does not make them poorer. [78] To his statement that from this "it follows that Christ gave a pretended and deceitful teaching to those who wished to attain perfection, in counselling them to leave all temporal things in respect of ownership and lordship", we say that it is false that he counselled this (at least, that they should not have anything in common) to the Apostles or to his disciples. This will be discussed at greater length in the objections made by this heretic against the constitution Cum Inter [97.1-]. [79] To his statement that from the above it follows also "that Augustine, and Jerome and other holy fathers, founders of religious order, erred, who, wishing to follow this counsel of Christ, promised to renounce the ownership and lordship of all things", we say that he plainly lies; for none of them except the Friars Minor renounced things from themselves, or from their Brothers, as far as concerns ownership and lordship in common; indeed, according to their Rules it is and was permissible to have even immovable things in common. [80 ] To the text he quotes from Leviticus 27[:30], "All tithes of the earth, whether of produce or of the fruit of trees, are the Lord's, and they are sanctified to him", and from Numbers 18[:23], where speaking of the perfection of the levites the Lord says, "They will possess nothing else, content with the offering of the tithes I have set aside for their uses and necessities". "It said 'for their uses'", this heretic says, "not 'for their Lordship'" [81 ] Indeed, by this he shows himself to be a manifest violator of the law. For in Numbers 18[:21-4] it is said explicitly that the Lord gave lordship of the tithes to the levites. He explains for what purpose he gave them, saying that he set aside such tithes "for their uses and necessities", but he did not say that the levites would be content with use of fact. It matters a good deal whether things are given to people for their use and necessities or whether use is granted to someone in some thing or of some thing. This was explained more fully above, where he quoted the same chapter [20.1-; 35.1-12]. [81.7] His statement that this is against the Church's decision made in Exiit has often been answered above [32.1-32; 42.1-9; 58.1-14]. [82 ] Again, this heretic tries to attack the constitution Cum inter nonnullos, saying that it declares that "it must be regarded as heretical to affirm henceforth that our Lord Jesus Christ and his Apostles did not have anything, individually or even in common; and in addition it says that it must be regarded as heretical to affirm that a right of using did not belong to Christ and his Apostles in those things that sacred Scripture testifies they had and that they did not have a right to sell or give those things or acquire other things from them." [83 ] We say that this heretic imperfectly reports the constitution, in respect of its last part. For after the words, "By no means a right of using them", he omits the words, "or consuming them", which follow there immediately. Again, after the words, "Or to acquire other things from them", he omits what follows, namely, "which, however, concerning the foregoing [acts], sacred Scripture testifies that they did do, or plainly supposes they were able to do". Accordingly, the better to reveal his fraud and malice, the text of the last part of this constitution is known to be as follows: "Further, for the future, to affirm pertinaciously that, in the things that sacred Scripture testifies they had, there did not at all belong to our Redeemer and his Apostles a right to use and consume them and that they did not have a right to sell them or give them away or acquire other things from them (which, however, concerning the above [acts], sacred Scripture testifies that they did do or plainly supposes they were able to do), since such an assertion evidently implies that their use and deeds in these matters [were] not just---and to think this of the use, deeds or actions of our Redeemer, the Son of God, is indeed wicked, contrary to sacred Scripture, and inimical to catholic teaching---we declare, with the advice of our Brothers, that that pertinacious assertion must rightly be regarded henceforth as erroneous and heretical", etc. [84 ] That heretic therefore says that when the constitution speaks of "have" and "belong" it refers to "having or belonging by right of ownership or of civil and mundane lordship, through which one contends and litigates in court". It is clear, he says, that it refers to this, because the constitution "evidently includes that Christ and the Apostles had, in the things Scripture testifies they had, the right to sell and give away and to acquire other things from them: that right, it has been made clear, had been introduced by human law. [85 ] Truly that heretic imposes on the constitution something that the constitution itself does not say. The constitution says that "to affirm pertinaciously that" Christ and the Apostles did not have, "in the things that sacred Scripture testifies they had, a right to use or consume them, or that they did not have a right to sell them or give them away or to acquire other things from them (which, however, concerning the foregoing, sacred Scripture testifies that they did do, or plainly supposes they were able to do)" should be regarded as heretical. And yet, although it makes no mention of the right of lordship or ownership, he nevertheless imposes on it that it meant to speak of the "right of ownership and of civil and mundane lordship, through which one contends and litigates in court"---and this because it has been made clear that the right to buy and sell and give away, which the constitution asserts that Christ and the Apostles had, was introduced by human law. And therefore he says that the constitution meant that "Christ and the Apostles had ownership and lordship of temporal things not only in common, but even individually---a statement which," according to him, "destroys and confounds every religious order that, wishing to follow the life and teaching of the Apostles, vows to live without property, and makes all religious property owners even individually and consequently transgressors of their vow, and manifestly conflicts with gospel and apostolic teaching, the teaching of the holy Roman Church, of all the doctors of the Church, and of the holy fathers who founded the religious orders". [86 ] Without doubt it is possible to repulse this heretic's statements with one remark, namely that he imposes something false on the constitution, by imposing on it that it meant to speak of the right of lordship or ownership, when no mention of lordship is found in it, as can be clear to anyone who looks at it. [87 ] But since this heretic pertinaciously asserts that Christ and the Apostles did not have ownership or lordship, in common or proper, of any temporal thing, we must see whether his assertion can stand. And because he says in the earlier parts, and also supposes here, that exclusive [proprium] lordship was introduced by human law, [87.6] we inquire first by what law the right of ownership or lordship was introduced. To this that heretic says that it was by human and civil law. To prove this he brings forward dist. 8, c. Quo iure, where it is said that by human law it is said "This estate is mine; this slave is mine; this house is mine". Again, he brings forward the statement of Clement reported in 12, q.1,c. Dilectissimis, where it is said: "Use of all things in the world should have been common to all men. But through iniquity one said that this was his, another that that was his, and so a division [of things] was made among mortals". And he means that "through iniquity" should be understood to refer to human law. [88 ] Sacred Scripture evidently says the contrary, namely that it was rather by divine law, and not human, that lordship was introduced. For divine law is what we have in the divine Scriptures, as we read in dist. 8, c. Quo iure, in the beginning, where it is said that "divine law" is what "we have in the divine Scriptures, human law" what we have "in the laws of kings." And in the divine Scriptures we read that before the laws of kings existed, indeed even before kings existed, some things were someone's; therefore, by divine law someone was able to say that something was his. The major [premise] is clear from the chapter Quo iure quoted above. The minor is proved also by77 the state of innocence. For it seems that in the state of innocence, before Eve was formed, Adam alone had lordship of temporal things. For he could not for that time have had common lordship, since he was by himself, since sharing [communio] obviously requires several. And that he was lord before Eve was formed seems to be proved expressly by Ecclesiasticus 17[:1-4]. For there it is said, "God created man from the earth . . . He put fear of him upon all flesh, and he dominated the beasts and birds." It says therefore that he dominated [dominari], from which it follows that he had lordship [dominium]: for according to Dionysius De divinis nominibus, Chapter 12, from "lordship" [dominium] is derived "lord" [dominus], "ruler" [dominator], and ruling [dominans]; from this it follows from the fact that he dominated that he had lordship. And that Eve had not then been formed is clear; for immediately after the words "and he dominated the beasts and birds" it continues, "He created from him," namely, from Adam, "a helper like himself," namely Eve. Wisdom 9[:1-2] supports the same conclusion, where it says, "O God of our fathers and lord of mercy, you made all things by your word, and by your wisdom appointed man to rule over your creation, which was made by you," etc. And Damascene expressly says this, in Book II, last chapter, as has been said above [27.19-23]. Also, that after the fall of our first parents, before the flood, and before there were kings, someone was able to say, "This is mine," is proved by Genesis 3[:19], where the Lord said to Adam, "In the sweat of your brow you will eat your bread"; therefore it is clear that Adam was able then to call the bread his, and yet kings did not then exist, nor indeed other men except our first parents alone. Concerning Abel also, the second child of our first parents, it is said in Genesis 4[:4] that "Abel . . . offered some of the first-born of his flock"; from this it is clear that Abel was able to say, "This flock is mine." Also, it is clear that after the flood, without the law of kings, someone was able to call something his. For we read in Genesis 9[:20-1] that Noah planted a vine and drank the wine it produced. I think that no sensible person will deny that he was lord of the vine, and also of the wine; and yet we do not read that any king existed then. Again, in Genesis 12[:17] the Lord said to Abraam when he was in the land of Canaan, "I will give this land to your seed," which he also did. And it is certain that those who were of his seed were able to say, "that land is ours," and not by the laws of kings; for they had it by a grant of God, not of kings. Again, in Genesis 26[:1-3] when Isaac went down to Gerara, the Lord said to him, "I will give the whole of these regions to you and to your seed"; his seed had lordship of these regions not by the law of kings, but by God's grant. Moreover, in Numbers 31[:53] it is said that "what" each one "had taken as booty was his," which it was not by the laws of kings, since the Israelite people did not then have any king, but its leader was Moses alone. Also, in Numbers 33[:51-4], the Lord said to Moses, "Command the children of Israel, and say to them: 'When you have passed over the Jordan and enter the land of Canaan, scatter all its inhabitants. I have given it to you for a possession, which you will divide among you by lot,'" and this they also did, as we read in Joshua 13[:7ff]. Therefore, each of them, after the division of that land, was able to say of the portion that came to him that it was his---and this not by the law of kings but by divine law, since at that time, as has been said, that people was not ruled by kings. Again, in Numbers 35[:2-3], the Lord said to Moses, "Command the children of Israel to give the Levites out of their possessions, cities to live in, and suburbs round them that they may live in the towns, and that the suburbs may be for their flocks and beasts of burden"; this they also did, as we read in Joshua 14[:4]. From these things it is clear that when the Lord commanded the children of Israel to give to the Levites out of their possessions, the children of Israel could, before they gave the possessions, call them theirs, and the Levites [could call them theirs] from when they were given to them---and not by the laws of kings, since they did not have kings, but by divine ordinance. From all of these things it is clear that we find in the sacred Scriptures that someone, both in the state of innocence and after the fall of our first parents, both before the flood and after the flood, was able to say, without the law of kings, that something was his. And in 23, q. 7, c. 1, it is proved that there are some lordships by divine law. [89] Further, that lordship of temporal things can not have been given to men by any human law but only by divine law is clear. For it is certain that no one can give a thing except the person to whom it belongs, or another by his will. And without doubt God was lord of all temporal things, either by right of creation, because he created them from nothing, or by right of making, because he had made them from his material; therefore no king could make ordinances concerning the lordship of those things except by God's will. Accordingly, it is clear that lordship of temporal things was brought in neither by the primeval law of nature (if we put that for the law common to all living beings, since that law does not prescribe anything, but inclines or steers toward certain things to be done in general by all living beings), nor by the law of nations, nor by the law of kings or emperors. Rather, as is clear in Genesis 1[:28-30], it was conferred on our first parents by God, who was and is the lord of those things; Adam, while he was alone---that is, before Eve was formed---was, it seems, alone the lord of those things, as was shown above [27.1-23; 88.8-24]. [90] It is true, however, that many ways of acquiring lordship were brought in by the law of nations, and some were brought in by the civil or imperial laws. Also, the way of taking action for these temporal things in court---that is, a definite form of putting forward one's right in court---was brought in by the civil laws. [91] From the above, therefore, it is clear that the chapter Quo iure, adduced on the opposite side, is no objection. For it speaks of the right of taking action in court; civil law brought in the formulas of such action, and nothing else.81 This is what Augustine meant in the chapter Quo iure, when he said: "Take away the laws of emperors and who dares to say, 'This estate is mine', 'That slave is mine', 'This house is mine'?", as if to say "No one can assert these things in court except through the emperors' laws", because law brought in the formulas of actions. Or it can be said that Augustine said these things disputing with heretics, not that he held this for truth---namely, that lordship did not exist by divine law. That it is thus is clear, because Augustine himself explicitly said the opposite in 23, q. 7, c. 1, where he said this: "Although no earthly thing whatever can rightly be possessed by anyone, except either by divine law, by which all things belong to the just, or by human law, which is in the power of the kings of the earth" etc. [92] Also, there is no objection in 12, q.1,c. Dilectissimis, which says: "Use of all things in the world should have been common to all men. But through iniquity one said that this was his, another that that was his; and thus a division [of things] was made among mortals". From this he [the appellant] says that the division of temporal things was made by human law, which is said to be iniquitous and contrary to the equity of natural law. We say that this is false; for "iniquity" does not mean the law of nations, since it is equitable; rather it means the sin of our first parents, by which [human] nature was corrupted, and afterwards it [human nature] was not content with common things but wished to possess things [propria] exclusive to itself. [93] Second, it is asked whether Christ had lordship of any temporal thing, and what kind of lordship. That he did have lordship of temporal things sacred Scripture, both in the Old Testament and in the New, testifies in many places. For instance, many prophets prophesied that he would be the king of the Israelite people, and consequently would have lordship of a kingdom. Isaias, for instance, prophesied of him in Isaias 33[:22] thus: "See, the Lord is our judge, the Lord is our lawgiver, the Lord is our king; he will come and will save us." Also, God spoke thus through the mouth of the prophet Jeremias, in Jeremias 23[:5, 6], "I will raise to David a just shoot, and a king will reign, and he will be wise . . . And this is the name they will call him, The Lord our Just One." For he is "the stone cut out of the mountain without hands," to whom "the God of heaven" gave "a kingdom that will forever not be scattered," as we read in Daniel 2[:44-5]. Also, in Zacharias 9[:9] he is spoken of thus: "Rejoice greatly, daughter of Sion, shout for joy, daughter of Jerusalem; behold, your king will come to you, just and a saviour; he is poor, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt, the foal of an ass." Concerning this David prophesied in many places. Thus in one place he spoke in his person thus: Behold, "I am made king by him over Sion," etc. [Psalm 2:6], and in many other places he prophesied that he would be a king. Thus the whole of the psalm Eructavit [Psalm 44] speaks of that king and his spouse, namely the Church, and many other psalms speak clearly enough of such a king. Concerning this also Solomon, in Canticles 3[:11], spoke thus: "Go forth, daughters of Sion, and see King Solomon," etc. Of this man, even before he was conceived, the archangel Ga