| Contents > Trajectory of Japan’s security policy: the power of perceptions by Kyoko Hatakeyama |
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Mitigating constraints in the 1990s
It seemed that the end of the Cold War provided more room for Japan to play a larger role on international front, even in the security field. Despite its wish to play a larger role, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 came as a shock by revealing the impossibility of Japan keeping a distance from military issues while it enjoyed a “one-country pacifism”(Ito, 1992, p. 281; Asahi Shimbun, 1990). At that time, the Japanese believed that its economic contribution to peace and stability could supplement its lack of humanitarian contribution. So the government was reluctant to dispatch the SDF for military support when the US requested but instead made a large amount of economic contribution.1 Embedded anti-militarist sentiment among the Japanese was still strong. This posture was, however, severely criticized after the Gulf War as Japan exhibiting “one-country pacifism”. The harsh criticism, despite its huge financial contribution, instigated a change in perception extending not only to the governmental level but also to the public level. A growing consensus was demanding that Japan contribute to the peace and stability of the world in any way possible. For the first time, the Japanese realized financial contributions were not sufficient and could not supplement the lack of more direct humanitarian contributions. Though not yet decisively, the focus changed from questions of SDF legitimacy or rearmament to Japan’s appropriate contribution to peace and stability in the world. This change in public sympathy indirectly allowed the government to move forward to establish a new strategic thinking. Although the first submission of the PKO bill (International Peace Cooperation Law, hereafter PKO bill) was abandoned due to the lack of consensus, the Miyazawa government forced through the second vote despite the tenacious opposition by the Japan Socialist Party. The government knew the public were receptive and thereby the initiative would not lead political chaos. The losses suffered by the Japan Socialist Party, which had been an advocate of “pacifist Japan”, at the election conducted soon after the adoption of the bill illustrated the changed public perception. In other words, the notion of “one-country pacifism” was not viable anymore. International humanitarian contributions within the framework of the UN tempered possible public hypersensitivity towards military matters.
After the adoption of the PKO bill, Japan’s contribution to peace keeping operations, starting with Cambodia in 1992, conjured up a favourable impression among the Japanese public that the SDF directly contributed to the world peace and the stability. Moreover, its assistance and help at the time of the Hanshin earthquake in 1995 and the subsequent terrorist attack with Sarin gas on subway in Tokyo by the Aum Shinrikyo Cult at the same year made the public aware that the SDF fulfilled a vital domestic as well as international purpose. The only caveat was a general reluctance to embark on anything resembling re-militarization. This growing positive perception of the SDF in the 1990s made a sharp break from the general public perception that had dominated Japanese thinking through the 1980s.
It was not only the SDF which elevated its position by winning public support and understanding in the 1990s. The Defence Agency’s influence started to grow incrementally due to uncertainty about security architecture in the region, exemplified by a security threat posed by North Korea and the Taiwan crisis. Coupled with a sense of uncertainty on the “drifting” alliance with the US, due to the disappearance of a common threat, namely Soviet communism, fears about its national security among the Japanese were intensified (Hughes, 1996). The sense of anxiety and the unstable international situation naturally encouraged a rising domination of security policy, contributing to an increasing legitimacy for the Defence Agency. As a result, the Defence Agency edged into a process of policy formation (Funabashi, 1997, pp. 112-116). After the Japanese government strengthened cooperation and political dialogue on security matters with the US in the middle of the 1990s, the Defence Agency entered into a more central role in terms of security policy coordination. Given these circumstances, the Defence Agency could exert a growing influence in matters of policy formation. Changed public perceptions towards security matters also contributed to the increasing legitimacy of the Defence Agency. The move attempting to upgrade the position of the Defence Agency to a Ministry in 2001 and again in 2004 implies a decisive change in the domestic bureaucratic balance of power and perception of the government.2 Elevating position of the SDF and the Defence Agency thus illustrate that anti-militarist sentiment was on the decline.
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| Contents > Trajectory of Japan’s security policy: the power of perceptions by Kyoko Hatakeyama |